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Chapter 1:
Introduction to
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Throughout the centuries of human civilization, the notion of the self-sacrificing hero has
evolved in parallel to the evolution of societies. Heroes are shaped by their creators—the
populace of a society—in regards to the ideals that society wishes to uphold. A hero is a person
who represents the greatest aspects of human beings, epitomizing the characteristics that society
holds most dear. These characteristics have transitioned in their levels of importance over time,
shifting the “ideal” self-sacrificing hero from one figure to another. However, as these
transitions occur, inevitable discrepancies will evolve in the varying minds of the participants in
society. Those who wish to value one attribute above another will disagree with another‟s
archetype of the ideal self-sacrificing hero. Ultimately, one view will prevail in the mind of
society itself, while the other will fall by the wayside. This thesis has been written to contend
that the contemporary view of the self-sacrificing hero is incomplete, and that another type of
self-sacrifice should be recognized for its contribution to society‟s greater good.
The introduction portion of this thesis will explain the evolution of the heroic figure over
the course of time. In this process, we will examine the attributes of the hero that are most
valued by society as the hero morphs from one form into another. Next, we will examine the
relationship between ethics and heroism and utilize this connection to describe the contemporary
view of heroism through modern ethicists. Finally, a brief overview of the rest of the thesis will
be laid out in order to provide an understanding of the structure of the argument that some selfsacrificing heroes sacrifice more than their lives to save their societies, and that they merit
recognition for their contributions as well as other heroes.
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According to Joseph Campbell, the figure of the hero has evolved throughout the
centuries from a cosmological miracle-worker to a defiant member of society. 1 Early heroic
figures derived from myths that detailed their cosmological origins, whether those origins were
the blood of a deity or a dragon. The emperor Huang Ti, who united China and was said to have
led his people into a golden age was supposedly conceived by starlight and could talk at the age
of seventy days.2 These types of heroes—predestined from birth and endowed with supernatural
powers—are manifest throughout numerous ancient cultures, from the Egyptian pharaohs that
were considered descendants of the gods to the Buddha. 3 Common folklore endowed the heroic
figures with whatever level of miraculous origins was necessary to convince the populace of the
hero‟s power to affect salvation. Over time, these heroes developed more human characteristics
that related their innate powers to those of the populace. Stories of miraculous birth evolved into
tales of humbler beginnings, such as the infant abandoned by a fearful mother, 4 or the child
sovereign sent into exile by jealous competitors;5 these heroes would later return to society and
utilize their innate powers to transform the world around them. These progressive myths
contributed to the perspective of a hero as merely a human being, but still a human being with
superhuman capabilities. Though these abilities were the product of the hero‟s destiny, the hero
had nonetheless to overcome the same obstacles and trials as everyday people in order to gain
these gifts through merit rather than miracles.6
Incidentally, this notion of striving to attain greatness later inspired the notion that any
human being can become a hero with enough dedication. In attaining these new capabilities that
render the hero powerful in the face of a society, the hero enters a period of obscurity, separated
from society by her talents.7 That which makes the hero supernatural leads to her being
perceived as an unnatural being, isolating her from her own humble and human origins.
However, through this separation and learned dedication, the hero becomes aware of her true
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character—her autonomous self—and enters the world as a creator, a person capable of
reshaping the world into something better than what it already is. 8
If the notion of society at this point was that a hero could improve the world, then
Campbell argues that the hero must then have begun to represent a transforming force against
conservative practices. As he phrases it, “The mythological hero is the champion not of things
become but of things becoming; the dragon to be slain by him is precisely the monster of the
status quo: Holdfast, keeper of the past.”9 Therefore, a hero‟s role became to transform society,
to unite the present world with the ideal world the hero hoped to attain. The enemy of an ideal
world is consistency—generation-to-generation monotony in a systemic structure—and the hero
became the agent of change. As an individual who was isolated from society by predestination
or by meritorious effort, the hero capably defined his own character apart from the society from
which he was born. This introspect rendered the hero with an additional capability beyond those
attained through years of separation and training: the ability to view society from an outside
perspective and judge it objectively so as to redefine it for the betterment of all within that
society. A hero, thus, by definition should instigate change, but whether predestined or
dedicated to a higher cause, the heroic figure nonetheless maintained supernatural powers to
become that transforming force. Later however, the heroic figure evolved in the minds of his
creators once again, this time to encompass the possibility that any living person is capable of
being a hero.
Campbell contends that the modern view of a heroic figure is that of a woman who,
although she lacks any supernatural powers, maintains the perspective of a heroic figure—she
can judge society objectively from an outside perspective and initiate change for the better. 10
Regardless of the idealistic origins and practices of a society, that society can always be
transformed into something more. This notion guides the hopes of countless individuals who
believe in a brighter future, and gives life to the need for an agent of change: the hero. The
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enemy of society then, as Campbell has already suggested, is Holdfast—the dragon of perpetuity,
unwilling to release traditions of the past for the sake of an uncertain future. These “keepers of
the past” are found in modern times; they are “namely the patriots whose ubiquitous
photographs, draped with flags, serve as official icons” 11. Those members of society who insist
that their society is a manifestation of the „best‟ society that exists, are precisely the hindrance to
attaining an ideal society. Thus, these agents of conservation become monsters in the
mythological sense, and the role of the hero is to destroy their strength as retainers of the past,
bringing to light a greater future.12 This type of heroism requires no supernatural birth or
powers. Normal individuals with autonomy, an individual perspective to step outside of society
and judge its deficiencies, and the willingness to heed this call are what Campbell would deem to
be “modern heroes.”13 They represent the voices calling out the wrongs of society in the face of
oppression, and risk their reputations, sometimes even their lives, for the pursuit of a greater
good. The hero then, has transformed over the course of several centuries from a divine force, to
a dedicated being who attains supernatural abilities, to an autonomous individual with the
perspective and desire to make the world a better place. Modern philosophers emphasize the
latter portion of these requirements to define modern heroes, essentially demonstrating that a
typical person, in order to be worthy of heroism, must demonstrate qualities of ethics and act as
an ethical human being.
Heroism is acting on behalf of others in such a way as to benefit them in ways that they
cannot benefit themselves. Thus, the notion of heroism is inherently dependent on the
interrelatedness of people within a society, and therefore is dependent on a notion of ethics.
Ethics is a method of interrelationships between individuals. Those individuals with ethics of
goodness place the needs of other before themselves because they are capable of rendering a
service to others so long as they resort to selflessness first. Thus, an ethical person, in essence is
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a hero, because an ethical person acts benevolently towards another person for the sake of
helping them in a way that the second person could not help his or her self.
Emmanuel Levinas defines ethical interactions through relationships between different
people. The entire essence of what is “ethical” is derived from each individual‟s sense of the
“other”—those individuals separate from oneself that give rise to the notion of “self” as an
independent entity. If the “other” did not exist, then we would have no self-awareness, because
there would be no “self.” Human beings require an awareness of something separate from
themselves with which their independent mind can be compared in order to comprehend even the
concept of what is a “self.”14 Therefore, because the “other” is the partly responsible for our
self-awareness, the “other” should be treated with as much respect and dignity as our own
personal creator, because the “other” is the creator of the self. Levinas therefore, contends that
the greatest good is striving for the betterment of the “other,” because the “other” defines our
universe. The essence of a hero then, in Levinas‟ view, is that of a person who is constantly in a
state of giving rather than receiving, of focusing on the “other” rather than the self, thereby
demonstrating selflessness. Levinas contends that whereas the golden rule says that we should
do unto others as we would have them do unto us, we should actually “do unto others as they
would have us do unto them.” 15 The role of the hero, as an ethical human being, is to promote
the greater good for the “other,” indicating that a hero plays a completely selfless role in acting
on behalf of society. Such selflessness places the burden of suffering on the ethical person,
which Agnes Heller advocates as a key feature of ethics.
Heller defines an ethical human being as one who prefers “suffering injustice (being
wronged) to committing injustice (doing wrong).”16 Advocating the same notion of the self as a
less important entity than the other, Heller believes that ethical people act on behalf of their
community to fight injustice, if not by opposing injustice, then at least by enduring its oppression
rather than contribution to it.17 A hero can be a victim just as much as a normal citizen, but the
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hero commits an essence of self-sacrifice to the cause of justice, refusing to do harm unto others,
and in turn accepting the harms that others would yield unto him. Even if he is not a powerful
figure, a man can still be heroic as a victim by confronting his (and others‟) oppressor.
Paulo Freire emphasizes this role of an ethical person as one who defies oppression from
a weaker position. He also believes, like Heller, that ethical human beings must take a stance on
their notions of justice, but he takes this argument a step further, indicating that the role of an
autonomous individual within society, as an ethical individual, is to “challenge and question”
authority figures.18 Freire maintains that each individual‟s critical perspective is absolutely
necessary to promoting the greater good, and that these individuals have a responsibility to stand
up against injustice.19 Institutions, he argues, are inherently damaging and oppressive, because
they advocate a single perspective rather than the myriad of perspectives represented by the
individuals they consist of.20 An ethical individual should act against oppression, therefore, an
ethical individual acting as a hero, according to Freire, should constantly criticize and oppose
institutions in an effort to enhance the voice of the individual. A hero should not only avoid
oppressing others, but should stand up to the oppressors within an institution in society. The role
of the hero in this instance relies on her ability to stand out amidst the other members of society,
and to influence change therein for the benefit of others.
Renowned philosopher Michel Foucault emphasizes the importance of individuality
within a society and the hegemony associated with the development of institutions. Ethical
human beings, as argued by Levinas, act on behalf of others. Foucault indicates that this is
possible only through the recognition of the autonomous self. 21 To reach the level of
individuality necessary to act against institutions, a person must first be able to determine what is
“individual” about herself. The next step then, in beginning to interact on behalf of others, is to
renounce this “self” that has been discovered. Renunciation of the “self” acknowledges Levinas‟
“other” as more important, thereby defining an ethical interaction between two people. Whereas
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Levinas emphasizes the importance of one individual never claiming to “know” another,22
Foucault claims that individuals should not permit systems of thought to manufacture individuals
through definition of what is “normal.” 23 Political and historical institutions of thought claim to
know what is true and what is right,24 but according to Foucault, “Universal truth and general
right are illusions and traps.”25 Regardless of how perfect a system appears to be, the power
structure of a society inevitably omits the needs of its less powerful citizens. This type of
oppression must be overcome by the individuals capable of impressing their notions of “self”
onto society, acknowledging the value of individuals even in a consistent power structure.
Furthermore, because the “other” is more important than the individual herself, these
autonomous thinkers have a responsibility to stand up against systems of thought in order to give
voice to the powerless. This movement is not necessarily political or legal, but rather cultural. 26
A hero in society must work towards cultural revolution for the benefit of the powerless.
Clearly, contemporary views of heroism inherently rely on a basic understanding of
ethics whereby heroes in society are those who place others above themselves, but beyond that,
they strive to improve the entire society around them for the benefit of all. This connotation
includes a hint of self-sacrifice, indicating that a hero holds the lives of others above his own, as
well as the good of the society itself. Such views describe the heroism of real individuals such as
Oscar Schindler, as well as fictional heroes like Superman. However, I would contend that while
these contemporary views of self-sacrificing heroes encompass broad elements of absolute
heroism, they also lack a key understanding of self-sacrifice that can be used to define an entirely
different type of hero: the hero who cares so deeply for his society that he willingly embraces
the role of the villain for the sake of the greater good. Contemporary heroes are respected for
sacrifice of life, liberty, and happiness, but what of the hero who is willing to sacrifice his soul?
If the conception of one‟s “self” extends beyond the physical, then absolute sacrifice of the “self”
would be the sacrifice of the very essence of one‟s morality. Levinas argues that the very
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definition of “self” begins with ethics, therefore, to eliminate oneself at the very core, one would
necessarily have to sacrifice his ethics for the benefit of others. Therefore, the intention of this
thesis is to argue that contemporary views of self-sacrificing heroes are incomplete. These views
should be expanded to acknowledge the hero whose sacrifice is so complete that he ceases to
become a hero and instead becomes a villain.
This thesis will demonstrate the importance of the ultimately “self”-sacrificing hero using
a variety of methods. First, we will examine the role of institutions and power structures within
society and their effects on cultural understanding. Foucault asserts that power structures lead to
the oppression of individuals through a process of normalization, which is called hegemony.
Hegemony exists within every power structure, regardless of its design or intentions. The mere
construction of a system of thought, a system of ideas, or a system of government requires the
definition of normality. Normality, by definition, must exclude certain individuals, or more
likely, groups of individuals from consideration of what it means to be “normal,” because a
definition, no matter how flexible, imposes boundaries on the notion of normality and prevents it
from extending to certain groups of people. For example, Foucault uses the example of mental
institutions, which house individuals whose mental status or behaviors deviate from what is
deemed to be within the confines of “normal.” 27 The only criterion that separates the “normal”
from the “abnormal” is the dominant perception of what the word, “normal” signifies. Thus,
mental illness and abnormality are not objective states of being, but rather social constructions of
the human mind used to draw a line between one individual and another.
The second portion of this thesis will involve the discovery of the individual “self” and
how that discovery leads to the creation of an autonomous hero. By defining what is “normal”
within a society, systems oppress the individuals that do not meet the criteria of normality, but
the nature of hegemony is such that even those who are being oppressed do not recognize the
source of their subjugation. Thus, to break the pattern of conformity with an oppressive system,
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an individual must become autonomous from the system of thought into which she was born.
She gains autonomy through recognition of the part of her self that is independent of society‟s
influence—the part that does not judge “normality” per se, based on socially constructed
definitions. Rather than depend on social constructions to define states of being, the individual
adopts an independent conception of these states and thus frees herself from the confines of rigid
social definitions. This frees the individual to pursue her own reasoning of abstract ideas such as
justice, heroism, and love, creating a new perspective through which she participates in society.
However, upon this realization of autonomy and its accompanying unique perspective also
generates a previously non-existent rift between the individual and the society from which she
came, because upon realizing this autonomy, the individual recognizes that complete adherence
to the societal norms is incompatible with complete expression of the self. Societal norms
require an individual to utilize the socially constructed definitions of abstract ideas in order to
live in concordance with the rules and regulations that have been generated from the common
understanding of those definitions. When the individual begins to utilize her own definitions, her
notions of abstract ideas inevitably clash with those of the system. Hence, the newly born “hero”
recognizes that any system used to define normality is inherently flawed, because it does not
account for the unique aspects of individuality and the value of every individual, including those
who do not meet the social definition of what is “normal.” Thus, in this section we begin to
define a hero as a person who recognizes her own individuality and willingly steps outside of the
“normal” realms of perception in order to transgress the constraints of socially constructed
definitions. A self-sacrificing hero steps outside of the systemic “box” of thought in order to
evaluate the integrity of that structure from a new perspective. The autonomous perspective
however, is not enough. As Heller, Freire, Levinas and Foucault suggest, heroism also contains
a strong element of selflessness, whereby an individual uses her new perspective for the
betterment of others. Foucault indicates that upon the final realization of the autonomous self,
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the individual then chooses to renounce this self in favor of the others within society. As a selfaware individual who views the flaws within a society because she has an autonomous
perspective, the ethical hero has a responsibility to then confront the system in order to instigate
change within it.
The third portion of this thesis will be devoted to the notion that the type of selfsacrificing hero described herein not only exists, but must become the enemy of the society
which he is trying to reform if he is to truly serve the role of a hero. There are numerous
historical examples of individuals who have sacrificed their lives and reputations for the good of
society, such as Martin Luther and Qin Chi Huang Ti, but there are also numerous fictional
examples that are relevant to this study, including Nietzsche‟s Zarathustra, Dostoevsky‟s Grand
Inquisitor, and Unamuno‟s San Manuel Bueno. Philosopher Richard Rorty contends that
fictional archetypes of people who exhibit cruelty help us as readers to examine the effects of our
actions on others through institutions as well as personal interactions. As an example, he cites
the reader‟s relationship with Mr. Causaubon in Middlemarch, or with Mrs. Jellyby in Bleak
House. In both instances, the reader becomes more aware of the effects of actions done unto
others through sympathy with the central characters. 28 Thus, Rorty maintains that fictional
examples of autonomous people are just as relevant as historical examples to the examination of
the human perspective. Since the type of hero defined in this thesis necessarily implicates the
autonomous person, this thesis adopts the same notions of non-fiction and fiction and applies it
to the concept of a self-sacrificing hero. By Rorty‟s examples, we can legitimately contend that
Martin Luther‟s historical self-sacrifice is just as relevant as the Grand Inquisitor‟s fictional selfsacrifice, and both are equal in validity to the story of Socrates, whose self-sacrifice falls
somewhere between the lines of history and fiction.
Up to this point we have demonstrated that upon the realization of autonomy from
society, the individual has a moral responsibility to challenge the practices of the existing system
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in order to reform it, but now our purpose is to demonstrate that this self-sacrificing hero cannot
accomplish this task without becoming the enemy of his society—the “villain” in the perceptions
of the populace. Thus, this portion of the thesis will demonstrate that the nature of hegemony is
to subjugate the individuality of the populace and its leaders, and to maintain this oppression
through the systemic establishment of norms. This systematic approach towards normalization
blinds oppressors and oppressed alike to recognizing the suppression of individuality by
emphasizing solidarity and faith in a system rather than a system‟s purposes. The autonomous
individual who adopts the role of the hero then, defies faith in this system by stepping outside of
the “normal” realms of thought, effectively becoming an outsider within her society. Outsiders
are permitted within a system of oppression so long as they do not oppose the established
guidelines of the system. However, as we have already noted, the role of the autonomous
individual as an ethical human being is necessarily to oppose the systems of thought that
suppress individuality, ergo the hero of a society—one who seeks to reform it for the better—
inherently becomes an enemy of the system by nature of opposing any of its established norms.
Those who faithfully adhere to the system‟s establishments will view the autonomous individual
with fear and contempt, because autonomy threatens their sense of solidarity. Similarly, the
leaders of society will censure the autonomous hero in order to maintain their seats of power.
Within a functional society that has defined its norms and expectations, the harbinger of change
is a villain to be opposed and ultimately destroyed, along with her ideas, because those ideas
threaten the solidarity of the system, and therefore endanger the order of society—from the
perspectives of those within it.
The final portion of this thesis will be its conclusion. Overall, the purpose of this thesis is
to define a new type of self-sacrificing hero who currently lacks recognition within
contemporary views of heroism. Current perceptions of self-sacrifice are limited to the sacrifice
of one‟s life, one‟s happiness, or one‟s livelihood; the hero who relinquishes his reputation and
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even his soul is still viewed as a villain until many years after he has truly brought about reform.
This thesis proposes that self-sacrificing heroes are those who willingly challenge the norms of
systemic thought to embrace change for the better within a society, and that these heroes should
be recognized as heroes, rather than as „enemies of the system‟ or „criminals,‟ as they are often
labeled by the societies they ultimately transform for the better. Thus, in the conclusion we will
revisit the contemporary views of heroism and compare them to the realizations we have come
across in the course of examining the role of hegemony in society, the importance of defining a
notion of the “self” to overcome this form of cultural oppression, and the examples of such
“self”-sacrificing heroes that exist in historical and literary examples. Ultimately, we should
conclude that some individuals who are perceived as “villainous” in contemporary terms ought
to be considered heroes for their efforts to transform the world around them for the greater good.
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Chapter 2:
The Inherent
Oppression
of Hegemony
and
Heroic
Transcendence
15

Hegemony is defined as “the spontaneous consent given by great masses of the population
to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group.”29 The
dominant group that forms the power structure of a society inherently defines its values of what is
„normal or „acceptable,‟ but whether it works by active coercion or subliminal communication,
hegemony itself is a term of domination over the human intellect.30 Processes of defining
normality occur in daily interactions between individuals, but the perceptions of these individuals
are shaped by the definitions of the dominant group—the group within a society that has the most
influential power. This group of dominant individuals utilizes these definitions—whether
intentionally or unintentionally—to reinforce the social hierarchy and maintain these individuals‟
dominant status.31 Thus, processes of normalization involve the transfer of concepts of „normal‟
and „acceptable‟ behavior from dominant power structures to everyday communication.
Agnew explains that hegemony has been used in the past to refer to the structure of a
dominating empire—an oppressive regime that maintains its standards of normality and rules
through coercion. 32 Dominant power structures that dictate normality via coercion rarely stand for
long, as the general populace is likely to disagree with the structure‟s definition of what is
„acceptable‟ within a society because of the inherent feeling of being oppressed. Individuals
living under a dictatorship are not permitted to express their personal views; instead their views
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are imposed upon them, drawing a natural disconnect between the individual and the perspective
they are supposed to have—according to the regime. Those who do not—or are not allowed to—
form their own views or express their own perceptions of what is „right‟ within a society, or what
is „good‟ never have to engage the topics at hand, thus it is easier to say that rather than having
their views expressed for them, they have no views at all—their perspectives are merely
represented by the dominant power structure, and falsely represented, at that. The individuals hold
no views of their own because they are discouraged from doing so. Ergo, what follows from this
process is an apathetic populace that does not engage philosophical notions of what is „right,‟ what
is „good,‟ what is „normal,‟ etc. Instead, individuals within this dictatorial society repeat
monotonously the mantras of the regime, never fully comprehending what the values are that they
are supposed to be preaching, much less understanding how to defend those values to criticism
from the outside world.
Individuals under the oppressive form of hegemony of which Agnew speaks represent the
shells of their philosophies. Coercive hegemony compels individuals to detach themselves from
the thought process involved in defining abstract concepts and instead encourages robotic
repetition of definitions of which the subjects cannot grasp the meaning because they have no
direct connection to the definition—merely a phrase that is to be spoken, and never to be
comprehended. Such a type of hegemony is insipid, to be sure, but not so dangerous as more
subtle types of sublimation. Coercive hegemony, while compelling, does not reach the
subconscious levels of individual mindset, and therefore exists only as long as the dominant power
structure that creates it. In a society where individuals are discouraged from autonomous thought,
their closest connection to their personal values extends only so far as the depth of their
entrenchment within the power structure; most individuals therefore, have no more belief in the
values imposed upon them than outsiders—they merely follow the rules and speak the words they
are supposed to without understanding their meaning. Therefore, when the power structure falls to
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outside influences, the hegemonic ideals that it sustained cease to exist, for there is no one
competent left to defend them.
Coercive hegemony is well portrayed in the film V for Vendetta. Recovering from an
apocalyptic era, the citizens of London live under the commanding regime of High Chancellor
Adam Sutler. When a deadly and contagious virus broke out in Britain, Sutler assumed the mantle
of leadership and used his influence to diminish the power of individuals within the society and
thus further augment his own. With the full force of the military behind him, Sutler restricts the
freedoms of Londoners by instituting random surveillance to monitor citizens‟ dedication to his
regime‟s cause, by heavily censoring the media for messages that run counter to the regime‟s
purposes, and by arresting any members of the public who question his authority or the authority
of his representatives, such as his elite police division called “fingermen.” This type of
domination by power forces the people of London to submit to Sutler‟s views by preventing them
from dissenting and also encouraging them to voice their thoughts in favor of Sutler‟s regime—
lest the random surveillances and fingermen repeat that the individual has not demonstrated
significant favor of the regime and therefore must oppose it. Sutler holds the power to execute at
will, therefore anyone whom he deems to be opposed to him is subsequently eliminated. In
response, the people of London post signs emphasizing Sutler‟s motto: “Strength through unity,
unity through faith,” and submit to any demands made by those in power, for those in power hold
the power to kill.
This coercive hegemony, while powerful, lacks somewhat in substance, in that it oppresses
the majority of a society‟s population, encouraging widespread internal dissent because anyone
who is not a part of the dominant power structure is not free to express their personal views.
Individuals outwardly ascribe to the demands of the dominant power structure, as the Londoners
of V for Vendetta ascribe to Sutler, but in the end when revolution is called for, nearly every
person in the city shows up to counter the visible power of Sutler‟s regime. The individuals who
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harbor internal resentment of their own oppression manifest their protest in the form of a
demonstration that changes, we led are to assume, the entire power structure of London for many
years to come. Thus, the external public assent, while it is influential in leading to further
entrenchment of Sutler‟s power, is insignificant when compared with the genuine values that the
people of London hold in their hearts. Coercive hegemony functions, but only so long as the
dominant power structure stands. When Sutler and his highest commanders are eliminated, the
people of London rise up, demonstrating that coercive hegemony is not so great a force as the
willpower of the people.
The other type of hegemony however, the more subtle version which Agnew discusses, is
far more insidious because it turns this willpower of the people into the very oppressive force that
those who are being oppressed ought to resent. Subtle hegemony is based on what Agnew refers
to as, “soft power.” This type of power is not coercive, but rather influential, using social
constructs to augment the influence of the dominant power structure. This subtle hegemony
pervades the perceptions of a society through social influences. By defining what is „good,‟
„right,‟ or „normal‟ within a society, the dominant power structure encourages individuals‟ thought
processes to work in accordance with those definitions. These classifications are not imposed on
the populace by coerciveness, but rather utilized tacitly within cultural communication such as the
media. The media, therefore, has the power to define normality by ridiculing that which lies
outside of the dominant power structure‟s definition of „normal,‟ or by praising that which
encompasses that very definition, establishing the „rules of right.‟ Such political sway need not be
obvious, for merely in presenting the news stories about one side of an issue and not presenting
stories about the other side, the media encourages perception in favor of the former. This type of
hegemony inevitably leads to the oppression of individuals—or more likely, groups of
individuals—by excluding them from the „normal‟ category. In defining what is normal, the
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dominant power structure establishes what is „not normal,‟ and abnormality, as a concept, links to
negative connotations because it is perceived as that which is outside of society‟s preferences.
Brenda Allen notes that dominant groups control the ideologies within a society, and over
time, these ideologies disseminate into everyday language, “become taken for granted and
accepted as universally valid by most members of a society.” 33 Such blind acceptance of
established norms disguises the potentially oppressive nature of these practices. Allen says
further:
[Rules of right] guide and regularize our interactions with others, and they help to maintain
power positions. Members of society and organizations routinely and robotically invoke
rules of right with statements or sentiments such as „that‟s the way we do things around
here,‟ „these are the standard procedures,‟ or „it‟s just common sense.‟34
This “common sense” logic pervades the thoughts of every individual and interrupts the normal
continuum of their independent responses. Even individuals that think autonomously from the
societal power structures still identify with the central values of the society to which they ascribe
themselves, so they contribute to this soft power by ingraining the values of the dominant power
structure into their own thought processes. Further, they neglect to recognize the source of these
responses—society itself—by connecting the thoughts to such asinine platitudes as “common
sense,” ignoring the powerful influence of social pressures and dominion through normalization.
Thus, groups of individuals are inherently oppressed by whatever definition of normality is laid
out by the dominant power structures within a society. This oppression, while inevitable, also
lacks recognition, making it more dangerous to those who are being oppressed. As Freire
explains, those who oppress others—whether consciously as in coercive hegemony, or
unconsciously as in the use of “soft power”—lack the strength or ability to recognize their
oppressive actions, therefore, the oppressed must rise up against the social order that is oppressing
them.35
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The more subtle hegemony, Agnew explains, is more insipid than the coercive form, for
the members of society ascribe to it almost at thoughtlessly as those under an oppressive regime,
but even more dangerous, they actually take the values of the dominant power structure to heart
and assemble it as part of their own value system. Individuals that perceive themselves as
“functioning members of society” value the society for its solidarity and therefore submit to its
most fundamental tenements so as to acknowledge that they are a part of that solidarity. Society
imposes the perception of what is „right,‟ and what is „normal,‟ such that individuals begin to
perceive righteousness and normality within these contexts and ascribe their reasoning to
“common sense” logic. Agnew says, “Hegemony is absolutely not equivalent to simple
domination (territorial or otherwise) but refers to widespread assent to principles of conduct that
are the „common sense.‟”36 The people give assent to relinquishing their power as individuals by
believing that common sense dictates that they should, because they work in solidarity with
society, and society demands centralization of power.
In Dostoevsky‟s The Grand Inquisitor, Christian followers do not question the cardinal‟s
authority, even when he arrests Jesus Christ, because their faith does not ascribe to Jesus Himself,
but rather to the sense of solidarity that the Church under Jesus Christ has come to represent.
They believe that it is wrong to question those who speak for the Church, because they have
willingly submitted themselves to a “higher power,” which initially was God, but has been twisted
through subtle definition to also be interpreted as the Church. Such subliminal manipulation of
the understanding of the masses of people that surrender their personal values to that of the
dominant power structure is exactly the type of subtle hegemony that Agnew warns us about. In
permitting their beliefs and surrender to Jesus Christ to be misconstrued into believing in and
surrendering to the values of the Church, Christian followers in The Grand Inquisitor give silent
acquiescence to the antithesis of their original beliefs. Through internalizing the Christian
teachings of submission, and allowing this submission to influence their own values, Christian
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followers unintentionally yield the Grand Inquisitor more power than Christ. As Agnew suggests,
this hegemony is far more dangerous than coercive hegemony because the people within the
society do not realize that they are even yielding power to someone else. Worse, the citizens
perpetuate the oppressive hegemonies that they take part in by permitting those ideologies to guide
their thoughts and behaviors.37
Unfortunately, the subtle form of hegemony that is demonstrated in The Grand Inquisitor
and occurs in a variety of ways in every society, not just societies that are dominated by powerful
political figures like the Grand Inquisitor. Even societies that do not intentionally create
oppression for any of their citizens must inevitably do so when they begin to form laws and
regulations, for the society justifies those constraints on human actions through moral arguments.
The society ascribes to a specific set of moral guidelines by which all members are expected to
abide, and these guidelines themselves derive from the dominant power structure, whether that
structure is a dictatorship with one person at its head determining the rules by which all others are
governed, or whether that structure is a democracy with a majority at its head determining the
guidelines by which all citizens—even the minorities not represented in this instance—are to be
governed. In any case, the dominant power will inevitably oppress the non-dominant powers by
electing to govern in a way that favors those who dominate society‟s rules and leadership.
However, as already discussed, the people who willingly submit to this system of government,
even those who disagree with its tenements, further reinforce the dominant power by offering it
their support because they favor the solidarity it brings over their autonomous ideals—as the
townspeople favors obedience to the authority of the Grand Inquisitor even after recently
witnessing the miracles of Jesus Christ and following Him.
Subtle hegemony is dangerous because it is a form of oppression to which even the
oppressed submit. Out of fear of losing solidarity with others, or dedication to a cause that
transcends the individual, he relinquishes his personal power and sense of values, electing to allow
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the society, which theoretically represents the „greater good‟ he wishes to promote, to choose his
values and actions for him. The individual‟s autonomous views may in fact be in line with many
of the society‟s values, but hegemonic influences manifest in the form of complete submission to
the views of the dominant power. Definitions of normality strip the unique attributes of
individuals of their potentiality of goodness by emphasizing conformity with that which is not
them—that which is the society‟s ideal, which no single individual can ever hope to encompass.
Ergo, these definitions in a sense, oppress everyone within a society by separating individuals
from their ideals and instead encourage them to live up to the impossible task of ascribing fully to
an ideal that is not even their own. Individuals that attempt to engender the ideal concept of
„individuality‟ as society defines it, inevitably become frustrated by the fact that even if they
appear to succeed, they are just like everyone else who has succeeded, and therefore not individual
at all.
Hegemony is suppression of individuality because it is submission of one‟s will to the will
of the dominant power structure. In a sense, it is a subliminal form of oppression because it is
self-inflicted, but that does not make it any less insidious in its effects. Even if not imposed by
coercive dominant power structures, hegemony damages individuality by encouraging suppression
of unique attributes within an individual. Favoring the protective and social benefits of solidarity
over diversity in viewpoints, citizens of a society relinquish their personal values, submitting to a
single, unified view regardless of whether that view lies in accordance with their own being. For
example, in V for Vendetta, Evey‟s best interest lies in assisting V in liberating their nation from a
tyrannical government; she even agrees that “this world is screwed up,” but when given the chance
to help assassinate Bishop Linnamen, she instead attempts to foil V‟s plot by revealing it to the
disinterested clergyman. She demonstrates the social tendency to favor rejoining the masses in
solidarity over going against the grain to bring society as a whole to a higher form of existence.
Through manipulation of the ideals of freedom and justice, Sutler‟s regime encourages obedience,
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and through the desire to become part of a greater whole within society, individuals such as Evey
encourage conformity. Within a society such as the London of V for Vendetta, individuals have
the option of submitting their willpower wholeheartedly to the dominant power structure, as the
unquestioning believers in Dostoevsky‟s The Grand Inquisitor, or of conforming to the norms and
expectations of that power structure, as Evey consistently attempts to do. In either case,
individuals cease to function as individuals—they no longer possess an autonomous mentality to
contribute a diverse perspective to their society, ergo they might as well be automatons—robots
mechanically performing a designated function but lacking in the ability to change or adapt.
The importance of change and innovation is a widely recognized economic concept—those
industries that do not consistently improve their product eventually lose out in competitive
markets to newer industries that produce superior products at lower costs.38 History has
demonstrated similar tendencies in societies, such as the Roman Empire that could not adapt to the
changing perceptions of the populace as they edged more towards pacifism and egalitarianism. 39
Stagnation destroys societies as surely as it does industries, because it undermines human
tendencies of creativity. Artists exist even in the most oppressive of societies create that which
does not already exist, thus these creative spirits assist in the evolution of the human psyche
towards new conceptions of the abstract. Under oppressive systems that suppress this
individuality, there is no room for creation and thus no room for improvement, but it is in the
nature of human beings to perceive the imperfections of their surrounding society. Thus,
forbidden from improving a world that they recognize as less-than-perfect, individuals feel
smothered. Subtle hegemony prevents these individuals from moving towards revolutionary
tendencies, thus further entrenching their own sense of oppression. This oppression manifests and
endures because of hegemony, and thus hegemony becomes the source of suffering within society.
The significance of an individual can be stripped away by hegemony through the
dehumanization of those who do not conform with the dominant system of thought.
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“Disabilities,” as they are termed in society, refer to abnormalities within individuals that inhibit
their ability to function as normal individuals. As previously discussed, the definition of
“normality” emanates from the values of the dominant power structure, so that which is perceived
by a society as “normal” merely reflects these values. In modern society, paraplegia is perceived
as a physical disability because “normal” behavior involves walking on two legs. However, if the
dominant power structure of society, say for instance, the majority of the population in a
democratic nation, experiences paraplegia, then this condition ceases to become an abnormality.
Thus, a “normal” individual is more likely to be defined as a person who moves about using a
wheelchair, and the inability to walk on two legs ceases to become a disability.
Similarly, mental disabilities are distinguished by mental constructions based on
definitions of normality. Brenda Allen discusses the effects of the DSM—Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—and explains that any person who demonstrates
symptoms of the disorders listed in this manual “is subject to categorization and stigmatization.” 40
Further, she points out that for several decades, this manual classified homosexuality as a mental
disorder, producing a negative social effect on countless individuals through a technique of
normalization of heterosexuality. Numerous mental disabilities may be interpreted differently
according to whether they are viewed as „disorders‟ that indicate some form of dysfunctionality of
an individual‟s mind, or as variations in perceptions or perspectives. Schizophrenia is recognized
as a mental illness because “normality” involves hearing only one voice inside one‟s head—one‟s
own—, therefore hearing multiple voices demonstrates a perceived wrongness in a person‟s mind.
Foucault discusses the fact that madness is the product of social hegemony, saying, “You know
very well that the mad subject is not an unfree subject, and that the mentally ill person is
constituted as a mad subject, precisely in relation to and over against the one who declares him
mad.”41 In other words, the person who accuses another of being mad defines the concept of
madness, and truly no madness exists except that which deviates from the perceptions of the
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dominant power structure—in this case, the accuser. This is not to suggest that clinical mental
disabilities do not exist, but that perception of what constitutes a mental disability in general, is a
social construct defined by those in the dominant role who define normality. Thus, a Nazi-like
regime has the power and potentiality to define those who disagree with them as „mentally ill,‟
because they can convince the populace through hegemonic influences that only the mentally
incompetent would express ideals that run contrary to the regime.
In Camus‟ The Stranger, the narrator of the story is condemned as a murderer with
malicious intent, even though he acted in self-defense in killing a man. The narrator is convicted
of murder because his behavior deviates from that of the dominant norm. The jury expects the
narrator to admit that his actions were the result of an emotional reaction to his mother‟s death,
which occurred earlier in the story, but upon finding that he has no emotional reaction to this
experience whatsoever, and that he shows neither sadness nor remorse for the person whom he has
killed, he is assumed to have had malicious intent in killing the man. His lack of emotional
response is his condemnation, for it deviates from the expected normal response of a decent man,
therefore, the jury assumes that the narrator is not a decent man—rather than someone whom is
merely different from them.
Similar to the instance of Camus‟ narrator in The Stranger, individuals are often
condemned of malicious intent within their societies merely for deviating from the thoughts or
behaviors of those enforced by the dominant power structure. Indeed, as Foucault suggests,
deviation in thought can be interpreted as a mental disability within an individual, undermining
that person‟s credibility in the public eye, and justifying their seclusion and confinement to
prevent these individuals from harming others in society. In this case, individuality is not only
suppressed, but it is also punished. Those who do not fit the model of the “ideal” citizen run the
risk of being perceived as not only different, but also dangerous.
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The irony of this situation whereby the unique individual is perceived as dangerous is, of
course, that society is more endangered by stagnation than by revolution. Just as inflexible Rome
could not adapt to worldwide changes in perception, societies that prohibit freedom of thought and
expression—new ideas—from emerging can buckle under newly emerging pressures. Individuals
who demonstrate diverse opinions and ideas expose societies to potential innovation, thus
strengthening the likelihood of survival in a constantly changing world. However, societies that
discourage these innovative ideas commit the sin of oppression of their citizens, and in addition,
they diminish their own ability to withstand change. Hegemony endangers societies that preach
freedom and justice by oppressing their own citizens, and it endangers them by putting them in a
position to fail to adapt. Yet, hegemony encourages the citizens of a failing society to label any
person who perceives this downward spiral as the true “danger,” because these individuals lack
“faith” in the system and therefore undermine it.
Perception of individuals who question hegemonic structures as dangerous figures within a
society is not new. In ancient Rome, individuals who perceived that the empire was
overstretching its resources and expanding too quickly for the government to possibly maintain
control were denounced if they shared their opinions with the general public. Those who thought
the empire was heading towards ruin and destruction could not possibly believe in the empire‟s
invincibility, and in ancient Rome, this was treason. Societal perceptions of Rome‟s superiority
had, at the point when the empire began to decline, started to encompass the notion of an
indefatigable kingdom. Through this hegemonic influence, the public was convinced that any
person who believed that Rome could destroy itself by overstretching its resources, did not believe
in Rome‟s strength as an empire because they did not believe that it was incapable of being
destroyed. The obvious error in this line of reasoning is apparent, for while an empire‟s ideals
may be invincible, its system of government and borders will never be thus.
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Regardless of the apparent erroneous nature of ancient Roman patriotism, such hegemony
persists in modern nations. For example, in the most recent war engaged by the United States, the
justification for going to war against Afghanistan, and then Iraq, was that the United States is a
world power capable of dominating many nations, therefore it should serve as the policing force
that keeps terrorist nations across the globe in line. In an effort to sustain funding and moral
support for troops, military leaders began condemning war protesters as “unpatriotic.” The natural
assumption of the military has been that individuals who oppose the war must naturally oppose
belief in their military and their government, while the truth is more likely that protesters believe
in the role of their nation as a self-sustained democracy that has no more of a right to impose its
system of government on other nations than Britain had on the United States upon its founding.
Inherent danger lies in these accusatory assumptions, because the oppression of one‟s citizens
diminishes public morale, and it allows unexpected occurrences—i.e. Rome‟s ignominious fall—
to blind-side systems of government and the countless individuals who naively submit to their
hegemonic structures. Thus we arrive at the role of the autonomous individual and her importance
in reforming hegemonic societies for the greater good.
Amidst governments that wield immeasurable control through coercive power and political
/ hegemonic influence and thus oppress their population and endanger it to unexpected
phenomena, the individuals who deviate from the “normal” and submissive group that follows the
rules and expectations of the dominant power structure possess the sole ability to recognize the
society‟s potential flaws and thus reform them before these flaws can be exploited to bring about
the society‟s unexpected end. Individuals whose thoughts do not depend on the pensive
reflections and definitions of others, or at the very least, on the dominant power structure, are
autonomous individuals. Their ability to perceive society outside of its own definitions is an
invaluable asset to analyzing the society from an outside perspective, thereby presenting
alternative viewpoints and possibilities while simultaneously exposing that society‟s weaknesses
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so that they can be strengthened to make the society better. The role of such individuals inherently
lies in their ability to recognize the hegemonic structures within their societies and how those
structures are oppressive.
Recognizing Heller‟s definition of an ethical person, it is at this point which the ethical
autonomous individual begins to defy society‟s rules and expectations. If every society, in
defining normality inherently commits injustice by oppressing individuals who do not meet its
definition of “normal,” then Heller suggests that the ethical person would defy this oppression,
either by not taking part in oppressing others himself, or by acting exactly contrary to that system
of oppression. Thus, the role of the ethical autonomous individual resides in passively or actively
contradicting the hegemonic ideals and practices of his society. The individual that chooses to act
contrary to the system of oppression, despite the fact that he need not do so in order to be
considered ethical, is exactly the individual whom Campbell would define as a hero, because he
directly pursues the greater good of his society by attempting to make it better in ways that other
individuals—because they lack the autonomous mindset to recognize the society‟s flaws—cannot.
This hero combats oppression within his own society while simultaneously preventing its selfdestruction, thus sustaining the society in spite of the likelihood that his perceptions and actions
will be viewed by the dominant power structure and its hegemonic followers as inherently
“dangerous” to that society‟s survival.
In the process of this transition, some would argue that the hero could possibly become the
tyrant that she seeks to destroy. Her efforts to impose her autonomous self upon society could
easily warp into a selfish act of oppression if she neglects the aim of betterment for those around
her. However, recall that Levinas‟ requirement of the heroic figure is recollection of the role of
the „other‟ in constructing the self, and deference toward the other before the self for that very
reason. A hero‟s primary concern is for the other, and secondarily for the self because the other is
the reason the self exists in the first place. As such, escape from the hegemonic structures of
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society necessarily implies that the heroic figure will help the other to escape from them, but never
to unjustly impose her own hegemonic structure upon that other for selfish purposes. Indeed, if
the necessary evil that this heroic figure recognizes within society is the construction of
hegemonic structures within themselves, then the hero must never so much as attempt to introduce
a hegemonic structure into the life of the other once the other has been freed from society‟s
constructions.
This is not to say that hegemony is possible to completely escape. We have already
explained here that wherever there is an organized system of government, there is a system of
moral values upon which it was founded, upon which the citizens rely to define their “normal”
existence, and which is inherently oppressive. Nonetheless, hegemony remains a dangerous
construct by which society can destroy itself, so it is important for autonomous individuals to
fulfill their roles as independent entities by challenging that system to move towards selfimprovement. Despite being perceived as the “danger” towards society, the autonomous
individual must protect society from the dangers of itself.
The process of autonomy and exercising its influence to better all of society is a difficult
one. Autonomous individuals are rare within the context of society because discovering autonomy
requires a great deal of self-reflection and a willingness to travel on unknown paths of thought
without moral guidance from another person or system. Even rarer is the autonomous individual
who chooses to wear the mantle of a hero, because that type of autonomy, while deemed ethical
and heroic by philosophers, alienates the individual from her society and thus, she does not accept
such a station in life without knowing that in doing so, she relinquishes her former identity and
any future attempt to assimilate once more into the dominant power structure. As such,
autonomous individuals who combat hegemony in an effort to live as ethical human beings and
thus reform their societies as heroes engage in a process of self-discovery that eventually becomes
their basis for transformation.
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The definition of “self” is a complex process, more so when that definition must be
constructed outside the contexts of society. Typically, as Sartre tells us, “The other is essential to
[our] existence, as well as to the knowledge [we] have of [our]self.” 42 Individuals define their
selves through comparison of their person to the “other.” This “other” is the average citizen that
one perceives as the epitome of normality—not a solitary, identifiable person, but the embodiment
of what this person represents: a functioning individual within the confines of a defined society.
We have already discussed the effects of hegemonic conglomeration—the solidarity enforced by
societal ideals that serve as the glue that molds individuals into a solitary „people‟—but now we
must examine the perception of this singular entity from within its boundaries, that is to say, from
the perspective of an individual within that solidified mass of others. Comparison is the basis for
self-definition, for it allows one to perceive the self in relation to that which is not the self.
Nonetheless, it is not possible for an individual to compare herself to a conglomeration of others,
ergo she must single out the attributes of what an ideal individual ought to be. Thus, the notion of
the „ideal citizen‟ is born.
Previously, we mentioned the impossibility of embodying all of the aspects of an „ideal‟
person, and now we will expand upon that notion. The essence of the ideal citizen within a
society is that this person fits the mold—the sum of expectations that society imposes upon the
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people within it. It may be possible for one individual to fit this mold upon society‟s foundation if
that individual was the founder, because only the founder can hope to encompass every combined
ideal of that society—no two individuals share the same sentiments about absolutely every aspect
of society‟s functions. However, any doctrine that is written in stone cannot change as the
perceptions of people do. It is in the nature of the person to change his perspective as he grows
older and wiser to the workings of the world and its peoples. However, the imposed rules of a
society, if they cannot be modified, quickly become incompatible with even the original individual
who created them. In large societies, this problem becomes even more pronounced, such as in
Camus‟ The Stranger, when a man stands on trial and is condemned for murder, not because his
action was not done in self-defense, but because the man feels no remorse for taking the life of
another human being. His prosecutor admits that this man cannot be blamed for his inability to
acquire the moral tendencies common to the other members of society, but says to the jury, “In a
criminal court the wholly passive ideal of tolerance must give place to a sterner, loftier ideal, that
of justice. Especially when this lack of every decent instinct is such as that of the man before you,
a menace to society.”43 The man on trial does not meet the hegemonic ideals of his society as far
as what constitutes a „decent‟ person, so instead of being perceived as a member of his society, he
is condemned by it as a „menace‟ to the foundational ideals to which all others in that society
ascribe. This man, who had no say in the foundational ideals of society in the first place, cannot
hope to live up to the societal expectations of an ideal citizen. Even if he had been more involved
in the foundation of society, he still could not hope to meet these guidelines, because even the
prosecutor, who represents the ideals of the people, originally attempts to vindicate the man on
trial because he knows that he is innocent. Yet, the prosecutor‟s perspective changes as he
discovers the „soulless‟ nature of the man on trial, and his entire conception of „innocence‟ evolves
from that point on. Even secured in the foundations of his original beliefs, the prosecutor‟s
societal perceptions change over time in such a way that he himself no longer embodies the
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original ideals he represented, so how can a person, such as the accused man on trial, ever hope to
represent these ideals? It is clear from this example that an individual cannot possibly meet all of
the expectations of the ideal citizen, for even if that individual exists upon the foundation of the
„ideal‟ model, the definition of „ideal‟ evolves in the mentality of the individual as well as the
society, such that no person can ever hope to entirely encompass the attributes of the „ideal‟
citizen. An individual self cannot exist within the contexts of society.
Definition of self, therefore, begins where the individual and the society clash, because it is
at this point where the individual becomes distinct from the mass of others that comprise the
society. The similarities between this individual and the ideal citizen are what contribute to her
perception of solidarity with others as a member of the same system of thought. In contrast, the
variations between this individual and others distinguish her from the ideal citizen, and thus the
society of which she feels she is a part. Societies that encourage diversity emphasize the positive
aspects of individuality and differences that distinguish between one citizen and another, thus
creating the notion that partial separation from the ideal citizen is not a negative attribute. Ergo, it
is possible for individuals to perceive their uniqueness in a positive light, which ultimately
enforces processes of social innovation through diversity in perspective.
William James argues, “There can be no final truth […] until the last man has had his
experience and said his say. […] However, the hypotheses which we now make while waiting,
and the acts to which they prompt us, are among the indispensable conditions which determine
what that „say‟ shall be.”44 Every individual perspective matters because each perspective
contributes to the overall perception of truth. If truth can be discovered through universal
knowledge, then everything that each individual knows is part of this conglomeration of truth.
James contends that each perception is an „indispensable hypothesis‟ of truth, and so to find
ultimate truth, we must acknowledge and test every hypothesis. Individuals that contribute unique
perspectives are instigators of social change because they influence the opinion of the dominant
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norm in that they present an opposing view. To present this view is to introduce a new method of
observation of circumstances previously unavailable to others because they could not recognize
the circumstances outside of their own experiences. Thus, the individual presents a new reality to
the conglomerate “other” and influences social change through alteration of perception. Without
this individual‟s perspective, the other would have no concept of a different situation from that
which already exists, thus change would never take place. However, upon the introduction of this
altered perception, the other then has the potentiality of recognizing various viewpoints and
adopting one that previously did not exist.
In order for an individual to adopt a perspective that varies from that of the dominant
norm, it is necessary for that individual to first attain autonomy from the current system of
thought. Comparison of oneself to the ideal citizen is merely the beginning of realization of one‟s
perceived separateness from the conglomerate society, but regardless, it is a critical first step.
Perceiving oneself as different from the expectation is vital to understanding one‟s role and
significance as an individual because it alienates the individual from the sum of norms that
diminish the individual identities of all others. By recognizing that he is different from all others,
an individual thus acknowledges that he is. Such recognition is the realization of existence, not as
part of a larger whole that is society, but as an entire whole within oneself who contributes to a
larger entity that is comprised of many individuals that are themselves whole. This is William
James‟ theory at work, for just as each individual perspective comprises part of the larger notion
of truth, the mere existence of every individual comprises the entirety of the existence of society.
As Levinas declares, recognition of the “other” allows for recognition of the self, ergo the
existence of the self is entirely dependent upon the “other.”
In order to escape one‟s identity as part of a greater mass and instead define oneself as an
autonomous individual, it is necessary to first escape the realms of categorizations and perceptions
that are used to define individuals within the context of a society that diminishes their
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individuality. Some would contend that this process begins with language, others that it begins
with person-to-person interactions, or perhaps visual associations. Regardless of the precise
method of the beginning of this process, the important aspect of it is the realization that the
definition of self naturally occurs within the context of societal perception, ergo it is dependent
upon a system of thought rather than one‟s self—we cannot define ourselves by ourselves until we
have first defined our self through society. This demonstrates an inherent problem with the notion
of autonomy, for it is impossible to define the self independently of a system that oppresses the
individual. However, as we have previously noted, the key portion of this process is recognition.
By defining the self within the contexts of society and using definitions limited by societal
perceptions to recognize the key differences that distinguish the individual from others, including
the ideal citizen that embodies society‟s preferred characteristics, the individual realizes a self
apart from society, some aspect of her independent being that transcends societal boundaries by
varying from the dominant norm.
Recognition of a single, distinguishable entity outside of the contexts of society creates the
notion of an autonomous self, but true autonomy derives from what follows this critical
realization. “Inasmuch as it can inspire revolutionary ambitions, existentialism must […] first
make a commitment to a self-examination process.”45 The autonomous self cannot exist
autonomously until it severs its existential origins within the context of hegemonic constructions.
Once one recognizes the self apart from society, he must then proceed to identify the processes of
hegemony that transform this identification into an epiphany rather than a mere reflection, else he
will remain entirely dependent upon those processes rather than his autonomous self, and will
cease to be autonomous. Hegemony encourages diminishment of the self and loss of
individuality—dependence upon the dominant system of thought—for the sake of societal
solidarity. Numerous hegemonies construct our entire conceptions of existence, from self-identity
to a sense of purpose and action. However, the power of a single individual is no less than that of
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a combined consciousness of individuals that represent the same societal „self‟ that these
hegemonic processes create. One individual who perceives differently from the rest of society
presents as many new viewpoints as the sum of the rest of individuals who think alike.
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his perceptions, too, have been shaped by society and its hegemonic processes, he has escaped the
confines of that source of oppression by recognizing it, despite its secrecy, circumventing the most
insidious attribute of oppressive hegemony in order to transcend it. He thinks independently of
the oppressive system, recognizes its original construction of him as a person, and therefore is
capable of stepping outside of the confines of those societal constructs in order to examine them
from a personal standpoint and reevaluate himself. Once this individual establishes his personal
relationship with the hegemonic structures, recognizing them for what they are and how they have
contributed to his self-identity up until that point, he can choose to conform to those hegemonies
or to criticize them and fight their oppression of truth based on his personal beliefs. Thus, the
individual recognizes the importance of his own uniqueness, and begins to develop that
individuality for the sake of becoming even more than what he already is—he begins to develop
the self.
In defining the hegemonic processes that oppress individuality, the autonomous person
must eventually realize that even the process that led to her self-identification is tainted with
groupthink tendencies, and that she has defined herself through hegemony and is not, in fact, a
genuine individual until she can escape societal definitions of self and perceive apart from the
thoughts of others. This does not necessarily entail total escape from the realms of societal
perceptions—i.e., common language, cultural and behavioral practices, etc.—but the individual
must at least examine these perceptions for what they are. She cannot choose to utilize language
as a method of communication merely because everyone else does, but rather because she
recognizes it as a common method by which ideas are transferred from one independent being to
another. Thus, the individual must begin a process of completely redefining everything that she
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perceives in light of self-understanding rather than hegemonic thought. If she defines even one
aspect of her life through the lens of society rather than evaluating it in light of her newly-born and
autonomous self, then she risks, at least in that one aspect, becoming a part of the hegemonic
system she only just escaped. As we have already said, it is not possible to completely escape
hegemony—it is too subtle for even the most autonomous individuals to recognize in every aspect
of their lives—but to conform without examination of those processes and complete accordance
with them is to become oppressed once more. Construction of the self, therefore, is a lifelong
process of examining which hegemonies contribute towards our self-understanding and asking
whether those trades of freedom for systemic order are in accord with our personal beliefs. One
must never stop examining oneself and the hegemonic structures that create us, lest we make the
false assumption that we have discovered all there is and fall into the same groupthink tendencies
we set out originally to avoid. This essay is not written to imply that groupthink tendencies are
necessarily bad, nor favoring solidarity over individuality, but for an autonomous person to exist
and contribute new perspectives to a perceptually stagnant society, it is critical for her to release
herself from the confines of societal definitions and think apart from others.
Solidarity benefits society, but stagnation is its bane. “My brothers!” Nietzsche warns us:
What actually poses the greatest danger to the future of man? Is it not the good and the
righteous? Is it not those who speak from their hearts and feel in their hearts: „We already
know what is good and what is righteous, we already possess it; watch out for those who
are still searching for it around here!‟
Whatever harm the evildoers may do: the harm the good do is the most harmful of all! 46

The “good and the righteous” to whom Nietzsche refers are those who are already satisfied with
the state of society and believe that it no longer needs change. Perfection is a lofty goal that some
argue can never be attained, yet societies all over the world contend that their methods are the
„best possible.‟ Democratic societies admit that although they can never fully represent the
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interests of all the people, their governmental systems are the best at doing this, therefore
democracy should exist everywhere. Nietzsche‟s warning to us is that these „good‟ and
„righteous‟ people who „know‟ what goodness and righteousness is, and act upon those tenets with
every fiber of their beings do society the absolute greatest harm, for as „perfect‟ as any society
may deem itself to be, James‟ philosophy resonates within us all—we cannot know absolute truth,
therefore we cannot know absolute goodness until the very last person in existence has spoken her
very last thought. Perfection cannot be attained until the end of everything, so those who claim to
know that we have attained it and should search no more do society the greatest harm by
discouraging it from continuing to move forward. “To know is one thing, and to know for certain
that we know is another.”47 Individuals who think apart from hegemonic structures are needed to
help us perceive this reality, for they lead the ignorant righteous out of their dark corners,
illuminating the potentiality of society and thus establishing the basis for an ever-brighter future.
In order to do this, these autonomous individuals must discover the nature of their inherent selves
and delve into that personal nature of existence. The self that exists apart from society is the
saving grace of society, because that individual saves society from itself.
Hegemonic processes suppress individuality, and upon examination of them, the individual
realizes this and begins to define himself beyond those processes. However, the realization that he
is a separate and distinguishable self apart from society occurred within the context of this
hegemony, meaning the process itself did not define him. Something that inherently suppresses
individuals from developing cannot create individuals, so the mere fact that his individual self
exists apart from the society and its constraints implies that something else created him. Since
there are only two entities—society, and all of its influences, and the individual—this necessarily
demonstrates that the individual is self-manifesting. From the stagnant oppression of society was
born a creative individual who thinks apart from all others and perceives differences that draw him
apart as a separate and independent self. Deep within his being, this individual exists, and has
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always existed apart from society and its definitions. Those definitions may have taught him how
to categorize and communicate his individuality, but the similarities and dissimilarities between
him and others existed prior to this understanding. He was an individual before he was the citizen
of a hegemonic society, and he knows this because the society that assimilated him as a part of
itself did not draw him apart by its own devices—something within himself did.
It is at this stage that the individual realizes her own potentiality and the nature of the
inherent self that exists independently of societal constraints. The hegemony that destroys
individuals can still be recognized as hegemony because certain individuals do not naturally fit the
mold of the ideal citizen, and thus they feel oppressed. The fact that these „abnormal‟ individuals
exist implies that their uniqueness manifests from who they are, not who they have been shaped by
society to be.

Thus, the individual recognizes that there is an inherent self that responds to

society‟s influences apart from the manner in which she has been taught to respond. She perceives
herself as different from others, not because she has been encouraged to perceive herself apart
from the unified whole of society, or distinguishable from the ideal citizen, but because she is
different, she is self-manifesting, and she is defined autonomously. This individual exists as a
separate entity. She exists, not as a part of a functioning society of solidarity, but apart from a
unified and stagnant system of thought. Her nature as a person who responds to external stimuli
exists outside of external influences and instead manifests from an internal self that has always
existed and responds in accordance with her personal preferences and perceptions, not the
perceptions that she has learned to express. This individual is, in the truest sense, an ideal citizen
within herself because she embodies the very conceptions of society through her experiences, yet
exists autonomously so as to contribute to its growth. The alienation she feels may diminish her
personal self-worth and encourage resentment of society from within because of that
diminishment, but Nietzsche says, “I love the great despisers, because they are the great reverers,
arrows of longing shot across to the other shore.”48 True citizens are they who love society so
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much that they begin to despise it, begin to reveal its inner flaws, because ultimately, their way of
contributing towards the goodness of that society is by reforming it. There is no better way to do
this than to develop the autonomy that breeds this „longing‟ for a better world. Autonomous
individuals can continuously improve their societies for the better, attaining the dream of making
the world a better place, and they do this by defining themselves apart from those societies.
Defining the self can be a tricky process, because it involves the use of learned processes
of self-examination within the contexts of society‟s methods. Psychoanalysis teaches individuals
to draw their emotional responses back to experiences in their early childhood, suggesting that
experiences shape an individual, rather than the individual being self-manifesting. Other methods
of self-examination, such as religious views of determinism relate the self back to cosmic forces.
Some psychologists suggest that individuals think merely based on processes of positive and
negative reinforcement from others. However, as we have demonstrated through examination of
an autonomous individual, the true self that he discovers exists apart from all of these external
influences. Society encourages individuals to relate their feelings back to societal influences, but
true self-examination must extend beyond these factors to find what is the response of one‟s true
self. For instance, if our self-manifesting individual was to express the sentiment that “hegemony
is bad,” he would have to reflect on where this sentiment is coming from. At first, he might find
that society utilizes the word „hegemony‟ in negative contexts, but this does not reflect his own
views, so he moves past such superficial realizations. He might then delve into the definition of
hegemony as a process of normalization, but then he must discover why normalization is negative
in his mind. Society encourages diversity, so he might conclude that because diversity is good and
normalization inherently runs contrary to diversity, hegemony is bad, but this still relies on
societal definitions. Perhaps he concludes that he enjoys diversity, but if he enjoys it because
society encourages him to do so, then his sentiments still are not self-manifesting. If he takes this
examination process one step further and evaluates the value of diversity as something that
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recognizes the inherent qualities and differences between separate individuals, he might then
conclude that he values diversity because he values differences between individuals. This value
may be derived from his personal sense of self-worth, because he recognizes that he possesses
inherent qualities and differences, and ultimately, he likes those differences because he values
himself as an individual that exists apart from the dominant norm. Therefore, he believes that
hegemony affects society in negative ways because it discourages his own existence, which he has
come to value through recognition of his self. Overall, the process of discovering one‟s self can
be long and tedious, because it involves going back to the very beginning of one‟s core beliefs
apart from the responses that individuals have been conditioned by society to express. Those who
truly examine their selves to the very core might find that their true self is not the kind of person
society would encourage them to like—an evil person, for instance. Perhaps they have a natural
tendency towards violence and at their very center, believe violence is not truly wrong because it
reflects their natural sentiments and the natural order of the universe by encouraging survival of
the strong. Ultimately, this process involves finding within oneself the true feelings and emotions
that exist independent of societal influences. This is how we come to know the self more
thoroughly, and thus develop an autonomous perspective, for the self that we learn to recognize is
independent of hegemonic processes and is thus different from all others.
It is not the intention of this essay to imply that experiences and interactions with others do
not influence our behavior and thought processes, but rather to imply that people‟s behaviors and
thoughts may not necessarily run in concordance with the sentiments or aspirations of their true
selves. Normalization and hegemony naturally encourage individuals to behave and think alike,
so these processes draw on similarities in human circumstance to encourage similarities in
behavior and thought. Rather than suggesting that some people are merely born with a tendency
towards depression, society relates these individuals‟ feelings to depressing aspects of their
upbringing, such as the death of a close family member of friend. This process undermines the
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reality that demonstrates that some individuals who lose close family members respond
optimistically rather than with bouts of depression. It is simply assumed that depression is a
„normal‟ human response, and that anyone who responds to the death of a family member
differently is lacking in some fundamental human tendency, just like the narrator in Camus‟ The
Stranger. True autonomy means that individuals respond in their thoughts and behavior to
external stimuli in accordance with their deeper selves rather than in accordance with expectation.
Cultivation of the self, therefore, demands that individuals act contrary to society‟s expectations
when their true selves diverge from the dominant norm. An individual who wishes to remain
autonomous and has a natural inclination to go sky-diving should do so, rather than avoid the
natural inclination because of society‟s emphasis on risk-aversion.
Autonomous individuals have the potential of revealing a new and diverse perspective to
their society by using normal processes of communication to share their abnormal responses to
various situations. Autonomy implies creativity, because an autonomous individual can develop
ideas outside of the normal realms of thought—her scope has no boundaries because it is not
limited by societal norms or perceptions that are funneled through the common lens of the
dominant norm. Therefore, autonomy is essential to innovative processes because it allows unique
solutions to be presented to new problems. A society is limited in its prospects by hegemonic
processes because it inhibits new ideas from emerging by encouraging everyone to think alike, and
to limit their thoughts to those that the dominant norm is likely to share. Innovation is an
important process in helping societies to face new challenges, like the inherent oppression of a
society that defines normality. Hegemony is destructive as a social process because it oppresses
individuals, but it is also destructive because it is self-proliferates—hegemony discourages people
from recognizing that hegemony affects society in a negative way and should be changed in order
to benefit everybody.
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Freire says that ethical individuals have a responsibility to stand up against injustice when
they recognize it, and to combat oppression for the sake of the greater good. 49 Ergo, an ethical
autonomous individual has the responsibility to combat the hegemonic system of oppression—
essentially, society itself—for the greater good of all of society. Oppression limits society‟s
potentiality, and hegemony further entrenches this system of oppression, so it is the responsibility
of autonomous individuals—those who have stepped outside of the cultural norms to recognize
independently of an oppressive system—to fight hegemonic processes, vindicating themselves and
freeing others from social tyranny. Levinas supports such notions, saying that an ethical
individual, out of deference for the “other” who essentially created the self by existing as a basis
for comparison, ought to strive for the good of the “other” always. However, in combating
oppression, it is important for the autonomous individual to remain autonomous, yet ethical in
striving for the greater good. He ought always to have the greatest good of others in mind, not
through society‟s definitions of “good,” which inherently oppress the minority, but through his
own understanding of “good” through his autonomous lens and personal experiences with others‟
autonomous selves. Nietzsche “love[s] him who squanders his soul, who neither seeks nor offers
thanks, because he always gives away and does not preserve himself” 50—real heroes are those
who know the self first but cares for the self second.
Hegemony suppresses autonomy, but so long as autonomous individuals develop their
notion of self and recognize that self independently of hegemonic influences like conglomerate
societies, then the hope that the wrongs of hegemony will be undone persists. Autonomous
individuals are the creators in society that present innovative ideas, but if they are to be ethical
individuals, then they should, as our philosophers dictate, also strive to better the lives of others
around them. Not every autonomous individual is strong enough to recognize and work against
oppressive forces like hegemony, but those who are become the heroes of society. A true hero is
an autonomous individual—someone who recognizes goodness itself apart from society‟s
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definitions of what is “good”—who works to better all of society and the people therein by
helping others to recognize their selves. This may be done by the hero helping others to reach
self-realization, but weaker individuals first need oppressive forces to be removed before they can
allow their true self to step forward. Thus, our hero, in reaching self-realization and recognizing
hegemonic processes, must help others by combating those processes that would oppress others
from being who they are in lieu of what society encourages them to be.
Definition of self is critical in the heroic process, for only through self-realization can a
hero step outside of the confines of society in order to recognize its flaws. By thinking
independently of a system convinced of its own self-worth, the true individual has the power to
transform that system for the better. Indeed, as we have shown here, the ethical individual must
do so for the sake of the “other,” fighting against oppression. Ultimately, the true hero is a person
who not only recognizes his inherent worth as an individual, but also the inherent worth of every
individual and the diverse perspective that she represents. By recognizing individuality as a
powerful attribute that enhances processes of innovation that drive society towards a greater good
for all, autonomous heroes diminish the hegemonic processes that drive individuals towards
groupthink, preventing oppression, and they also help society to drive itself towards selfimprovement without the need for drastic cataclysms to help society “start over” and thus repeat
its mistakes of the past. Heroism is salvation of those who cannot help themselves, but it is also
salvation of those who do not realize they are in need of help.
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Chapter 4:
Villainous
Heroism: Mirror
of Society
48

One of the most critical attributes of the self-sacrificing heroes outlined here in this essay
is that these heroes are originally perceived as villains. Numerous characters throughout the
course of history have fulfilled this role as autonomous individuals who sought to overthrow a
system of hegemony by challenging it, and were subsequently chastised and despised for it, only
to be recognized as heroes by society many years later. Martin Luther serves as a valuable
example—portrayed as an enemy of the Church for criticizing it to the point of division, he is now
viewed as an ethical reformist who elicited the flawed political intrigues of 15 th century
Catholicism. Luther‟s sacrificed his reputation in an attempt to help better the Church, and like
many such heroes who dare to challenge the systems of which they are a part, he was viewed as an
enemy of the system for many years thereafter. Autonomous heroes of history like Luther
sacrificed a great deal for the sake of getting their message out, and were only viewed as the
heroes they were many years after their deaths. Still more of these heroic figures exist in fictional
stories that drive into the heart of mankind for the sake of elaborating on our characteristic
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weaknesses. Regardless of their historic or fictional origins, each of these characters contributes
towards the overall perception of what the ideal self-sacrificing hero ought to be.
History has demonstrated that those who challenge governmental systems of oppression
are the first to be chastised for their efforts, and one of the best examples of this is the story of
Socrates. A sage-like figure in democratic Athens, Socrates taught that such worldly pursuits as
wealth and athleticism were fleeting, whereas virtues were eternal. The Athenian government
encouraged admiration of those who succeeded materialistically, and indeed, a politician‟s interest
lay in securing increasing financial stability for himself and his family. Lawful regulation of
men‟s actions, and encouragement of individual‟s self-pursuit was what made Athens great during
its time, for the governmental system encouraged men to follow their own hearts, and empowered
them to do so by having an influence in the governmental process. As Foucault tells us,
Among the Greeks and Romans […] concern with the self and care of the self were
required for right conduct and the proper practice of freedom, in order to know oneself […]
as well as to form oneself, to surpass oneself, to master the appetites that threaten to
overwhelm one. 51
Indeed, Athens‟ system encouraged such individuality as to function as a stable, yet mostly
peaceful state surrounded by other cities in turmoil, because its citizens were content to pursue
their own goals, and as long as they continued such pursuits, Athenian democracy—in a political
as well as economic sense—flourished. Care for the individual fostered care for the society, and
thus both flourished. However, as all societies, Athens was founded upon an original system of
morals and values that, once undermined, would represent the end of the government as it stood.
This is the reason that eventually, Socrates is accused of „corrupting‟ the Athenian youth, for his
purpose in cultivating virtue undermines the pragmatic purpose of Athenian democracy.
Stanley Fish asserts that it is the moral responsibility of one who believes he is right to
assert his perspectives “with a vengeance” 52 upon others, which is what the Athenian government
eventually does in sentencing Socrates to death. However, other scholars contend that in the
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pursuit of ultimate truth, which was the aim of Socrates and the Athenian politicians, one must be
open and willing to listen to and accept the ideas of others as potential truths within themselves. 53
In his trial, Socrates contends,
I spend my whole life in going about and persuading you all to give your first and chiefest
care to the perfection of your souls, and not till you have done that to think of your bodies,
or your wealth; and telling you that virtue does not come from wealth, but that wealth, and
every other good thing which men have, whether in public, or in private, comes from
virtue. If then I corrupt the youth by this teaching, the mischief is great.54
His stance is that in teaching the youth of Athens to pursue something more than the material
gains of life and politics, he has cultivated the truest Athenian citizen the government could ask
for. The individuality promoted by democracy encourages citizens to pursue higher truths for
themselves, and in exercising this freedom, Socrates has discovered that higher truth resides in
contemplation and thought rather than in the gathering of possessions and power. Ultimately, he
engages in this higher contemplation only to discover that his thoughts extend beyond himself and,
in order to attain their fullest potential, must be shared with the minds of others. As he has been
encouraged to share his voice in a democratic society that believes in pursuing the greatest good
through the concept of the marketplace of ideas, by fully engaging the concept of freedom of an
Athenian citizen and exercising his individuality, Socrates fulfills his duty as a moral citizen. His
only error, then, lies in the assumption that the Athenian society truly exists according to its
philosophical intent, rather than its pragmatic one.
Schauer‟s criticism of the marketplace of ideas resides within the impracticality of a fully
rational society. He understands that complete rationality does not exist “for the public at large,” 55
and thus for the sake of pragmatism, advocates that some opinions must be suppressed for
society‟s good. In a parallel context, pragmatism outweighs the philosophical aims of the
Athenian government, for practicality within society demands materialistic pursuits in order to
maintain a functioning economy. As such, rather than extol Socrates for his brilliance in
exercising his democratic voice to contribute to the general Athenian conception of truth, the
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politicians condemn Socrates as a corrupting force who misleads good citizens on their paths
toward greatness. In asserting philosophical virtues over political gains, Socrates undermines the
power structure of Athens and turns society on its head so far as its methodologies for functioning
from a political, economic, religious, and social standpoint. Pragmatism overrules his pursuit of
truth, and thus Socrates, in seeking to become a hero to his society by liberating it from the
shadowy falsities of materialism, becomes perceived as a villain who corrupts the youth of his fair
city, because he advocates a level of dedication to truth that his society finds unrealistic and
dangerous. His undoing is in being the ultimate citizen, because he pursues society‟s ideals
instead of its reality.
In the end, Socrates dies for „the good of Athenian society‟ so far as the political leaders of
Athens are concerned, because in ending his life, they put an end to the threat to their livelihood
that he represents. Athenian society cannot coexist with Socrates‟ pursuit of truth, although it
does maintain that truth can only be attained through pursuit of knowledge and dialogue. In other
words, Athens divines a means by which to attain truth, and even asserts to provide that means
through a democratic government where society is founded upon the notions of rationality and
dialogue. However, the fundamental assumptions of that foundation limit the society to rationality
and dialogue only so far as those ideals do not inhibit functionality. As soon as open thought and
participation in the democratic process become a hindrance to society functioning with the
underlying assumptions of how a society ought to function, that openness vanishes and gives way
to a society of boundaries and rules.
Every society is composed of countless hegemonic structures, and one of the fundamental
hegemonies from which Socrates sought to escape in Athens was the hegemony of pragmatism
over idealism. Ultimately, the higher truth is the aim of both the Athenian politicians and
Socrates, but the hegemonic structure laid down with the foundation of Athens placed pragmatism
first, because it is pragmatism alone that preserves society from failure. As a true self-sacrificing
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hero, Socrates defied that hegemonic structure, challenged it, and lost. He became perceived as a
villain, not by all of the Athenians, but by their leaders who recognized the importance of
pragmatism and placed the survival of society above its definition as a truth-pursuing society.
Clearly such practicality is not a crime, for it represents preservation of the people—a lofty goal,
indeed, for supposedly self-serving politicians. Guardini suggests that Socrates‟ case is not a
matter of right and wrong, but rather a matter of right vs. right and who has the authority to assert
one over the other.56 Athens‟ hypocrisy therefore, lies in using that power to oppress the type of
free-thinking it claims to condone, and Socrates‟ only „crime‟ is in asserting those claims to their
fullest extent, living as a true Athenian who puts the pursuit of truth and the common good above
all else.
Socrates exemplifies our self-sacrificing hero in the contexts of defying society in order to
better it, and being despised for attempting to undermine the false hegemonic structures that
construct everyday existence in order to free others to pursue a greater purpose. However, one
must not overlook the fact that Socrates is able to accomplish this goal from within the society,
without every needing to step outside of it and transcend its bounds. He defies Athenian
rationality through rational arguments, using the same discourse that constructs Athenian life, but
challenging it nonetheless. In some ways, this is much more difficult than challenging a society
from without, but in others it is much easier. Socrates challenges the assumptions that the ultimate
pursuits of life are based on materialism, yet he never escapes the material benefits of having
grown up in Athenian wealth. Despised only by leaders for endangering their way of life, Socrates
dies a villain to very few, because his challenge to society is not great, it merely represents a way
of thinking that those in power are not prepared to accept. Those who truly matter—his
disciples—see Socrates as a hero from the start, and thus they preach his message of the pursuit of
truth, purporting it to be the greatest pursuit and listening to none who would challenge them.
Thus Socrates‟ followers engage in their own, newly-defined hegemony in search for Socrates‟
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intent instead of the significance of his actual message that truth can be discovered through
rational dialogue, and it truly is the highest pursuit of all. The story of Socrates is one of selfsacrifice and heroism, but this heroism does not delve deeply enough to capture the ideals of this
essay.
One of the most historical figures who pursued a greater good through less-than-ideal
actions was Qin Chi Huang Ti—the first emperor of China. History describes very little of Huang
Ti‟s personal motivations, but Quentin Tarantino‟s film Hero portrays the emperor in a fictional,
but ideal mystical light. Perceived as a tyrant by even his closest advisors, Huang Ti begins his
conquest as one of many kings in his region. A brilliant military tactician, he ravages the towns
and cities of his numerous rivals, forcing his opponents into submission one by one. This
ultimately wins him the hatred of countless warriors, including four assassins who risk their very
lives to see Huang Ti killed. However, as one assassin named Broken Sword prepares to deliver
the death blow to the tyrannical king, he looks into Huang Ti‟s eyes and sees the king‟s true intent.
He allows Huang Ti to live, as does the hero “Nameless,” once they realize that Huang Ti, while
malicious and tyrannical, seeks to unite the kingdoms in order to end all wars between his people
and others. For the sake of uniting all of the land, he willingly takes on the mantle of the villain,
slaughtering hundreds of thousands, leaving enemies and burned villages in his wake, but in the
end, as history tells us, it leads to the unification of China, and the founding of a great nation
where war is no longer the rule, but the exception to everyday life.
Although Huang Ti‟s challenge to hegemonic structures in his society is very different
from that of Socrates, his mission is no less heroic. Whereas Socrates challenges the predominant
notions of materialism through rhetoric, Huang Ti challenges the predominant notions of
continuous war. Just like other societies trapped in hegemonic ideals discussed previously, the
kingdom of Qin and other surrounding nations have mentally embraced war as a necessary part of
life. Caught up in retributive battles based on retribution for more battles in the past, each
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kingdom fights ceaselessly with one another because every citizen has adopted the hegemonic
ideal, as Brenda Allen suggests, that, “that‟s the way we do things around here.” 57 Citizens of
Qin, as well as previous kings of Qin fall into this pattern of thought. They never look past the
hegemony that constructs the pattern to realize that reform will not come from continuing to fight
one retribution battle after another, but rather from stepping outside of that pattern and mastering
the entire region under one unified dominion instead of a conglomeration of regions that cannot
coexist autonomously. Qin Chi Huang Ti finally challenges this ideology by refusing to be
satisfied with mere vengeance and instead taking his war to a more global level such that his
enemies will not return to stab him in the back.
Like Socrates, Huang Ti fails to step outside of the structure from which he seeks to
liberate his society, for he commits to warlike action to end war—hypocrisy, in its truest sense.
Nonetheless, Huang Ti also takes another critical step beyond Socrates, in that he willingly goes
so far to challenge the structure of which he is a part that he becomes society‟s enemy in society‟s
eye. In Hero, the king even acknowledges that the people closest to him “regard [him] as a
tyrant,” and he willingly accepts that role for the betterment of all. He knows that uniting the land
will bring the greatest benefit to his people overall, but that such a task must be purchased with the
blood of countless innocents. Huang Ti sacrifices his very soul, becoming the „evil‟ that he
condemns in order to pursue a greater good, demonstrating dedication, in the truest sense, to his
cause. Socrates is not willing to compromise himself for the benefit of others, and indeed, he does
not need to. However, Huang Ti makes the ultimate sacrifice by recognizing that even though the
very people he is trying to save may hate him, he will take the role of the villain and the tyrant for
their sake.
Huang Ti‟s sacrifice is especially unique because it justifies evil for the sake of a greater
good. Is a hero then, any person who challenges society‟s norms by committing evil acts? Is
Hannibal Lector a hero? Is Osama bin Laden? I would not go so far as to say so. We must always
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keep in mind the ethical components of a hero as constructed at the beginning of this essay, that
ultimately, a hero is a moral person that, as Heller suggests, prefers “suffering injustice (being
wronged) to committing injustice (doing wrong),”58 who always keeps in mind a personal
conception of the responsibility to the “other” who constructs us. A hero fights against the
oppression of others out of a sense of moral responsibility and awareness of others before
oneself. Historically it is impossible to determine whether Huang Ti‟s actions were moral—and
therefore heroic—but even in the fictional contexts of Quentin Tarantino‟s Hero we must ask
ourselves whether Huang Ti‟s pursuits are made out of an awareness for the sufferings of others,
or rather out of his personal sense of suffering from the harms of war. It appears to me that the
case falls into the latter category: Huang Ti is still not an ideal hero, because he does not
necessarily commit to all-out war for the good of his people, but for his own sense of security.
Indeed, an ideal hero might have sought conquest without bloodshed so as to promote the greatest
good for all, but he does go one step further in willingly becoming the villain to his society, if only
so that society itself would be made better by his actions. Socrates argues against the judgment
brought upon him, but still accepts his society for what it is; in contrast, Huang Ti defies his.
At this point, when we find ourselves questioning the importance of morality in a selfsacrificing hero, we should turn to a hero whose morality is considered by many to be
unquestionable: Jesus Christ. Whether taken in a historical context or a mythical one, the story of
Jesus of Nazareth advocates peace and understanding far above any notions of hostility or
retribution. Indeed, Jesus exemplifies our self-sacrificing hero because of his peacefulness, for
many of his challenges to the authority figures in Rome resounded on the harsh treatment of those
who were already suffering—such as beggars, prostitutes and thieves. Jesus called his followers
to forgive and be merciful, whereas Roman authorities called its citizens to punish their criminals
without mercy. Thus, Jesus preached a message of love in place of condemnation, of peace in
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place of hostility, and of forgiveness in place of chastisement, all for the sake of betterment within
oneself and of one‟s neighbors.
Just as in the case of Athens and Socrates, the Romans were not wrong to advocate
something different from our heroic figure. Indeed, religious history would have us perceive
Roman society as a malicious and evil empire, but one must remember that Rome flourished with
great technology, innovation, and social movements for a reason: its societal construction
functioned. The punishments that Jesus preached against were harsh in Roman society to deter
criminals from repeating their offense, which made Roman citizens feel like they lived in a safe
world in which they were free to go about their daily lives without fear of being mugged or
murdered. As Moore says, “horrible cruelty was appropriate and necessary to combat morally
horrible and socially dangerous crimes.”59 Castigation maintained order in a free society and
encouraged tremendous wealth, prosperity, and growth. Fostered by this prosperity, Jesus grew to
recognize that the hegemonic structure of Rome could lead to humanity‟s self-destruction if that
system could not be changed, for the abuse of power is as potentially damaging as the lack thereof.
Thus, he took it upon himself to rationalize mercy in the minds of his brethren, to preach peace as
the ultimate end for all wars, and to teach forgiveness as the path towards Paradise, for every
person in this world has been wronged by another, and in turn every person has wronged another.
Pursuit of retribution is what ultimately leads to the vicious circle of wars and poverty; escape
from it must come about by another means.
Jesus‟ recognition of a hegemonic structure within society is perhaps one of the most
prominent in recorded history, for his was a method that escaped the cultural norms of thousands
of years of western civilization. He truly epitomizes the ideal of escaping a hegemonic structure
and defying it in an attempt to re-form society into something better. Indeed, his defiance of
Roman culture is what eventually led to his execution, which inevitably causes us to view him as
the ultimate self-sacrificing hero. However, in examining Jesus, we must keep in mind that, like
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Socrates, Jesus was not entirely opposed by general society. Tales of Jesus record numerous
followers who traveled with him and spread his message, and many more who preached it after his
death, birthing the religion of Christianity. He is a hero who stepped outside of the dominant
paradigm of society in order to reform it, but Jesus was far from an exile within his own
community. Unlike Qin Chi Huang Ti, who incurred the hatred of his own people and lived in
solitude amidst his own courtiers, Jesus was admired and revered by many throughout the course
of his life because he never transcended the boundaries of acceptability, challenging his followers
to redefine their existence through a different lens, but rather, he marched to the beat of the Roman
citizens‟ drum and left words in his midst to propagate postmortem. Jesus‟ sacrifice is different
because the sacrifice of his “self” only includes his physical “self”—for that is what inspired
defiance and reform in his followers.
In the second chapter of this essay, we examined the significance of the “self” and its
discovery in defining the self-sacrificing hero. Jesus Christ nearly captures the ideal selfsacrificing hero, except that the “self” that he gives is less than all of his “self” as it has been
described. Self-sacrificing heroes such as Jesus have been revered throughout the centuries for
their courageousness in facing death for their beliefs, Socrates being another excellent example.
However, the purpose of this essay is not to reemphasize the glory of such heroism, but rather to
examine a different type of heroism that is too-often overlooked: that of women and men who
sacrifice the entirety of their selves—the hidden essences that extend to their very souls, such that
even they might perceive themselves as evil in the end, for they are willing to take on the burden
of sin for themselves, that others need not. It is said by Christians that Jesus took the burden of
the sins of humankind upon himself at his death, despite never having sinned himself, and he is
certainly a hero, in the truest sense for doing so, but Jesus never endangered his own soul by being
perceived as a villain for the greater good. He never risked spending eternity in Hell so that his
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followers would not have to. The biblical Jesus led his followers to a greater world, so he did not
sacrifice his own eternity for their sake; our self-sacrificing hero would.
Contrasting with the mortal self-sacrifice of Jesus Christ, and paradoxically a fictional tale
about one of Jesus‟ followers, one of the most inspiring tales of a truly “self”-sacrificing hero that
comes to mind is Miguel Unamuno‟s San Manuel Bueno. The priest of a small Catholic village in
Spain, Don Manuel inspires the lives of countless people around him by demonstrating the utmost
faith in God and His divine mercy and compassion. Drawn to the priest‟s spirituality, the story‟s
narrator, Angela, commits herself to the service of the Church, and attempts to convert her atheist
brother Lazzaro to Christianity for fear of his soul. Don Manuel helps Lazzaro to come to terms
with the existence of God by confessing that he—a priest—does not believe in God, either. When
confronted with the notion that he is living a lie and will probably spend eternity in Hell for his
lack of faith, Don Manuel essentially tells Angela that while he does not believe in God, he does
have faith in the belief in God—the notion that belief in God brings out the betterment of human
kind. Don Manuel, knowing that if he is wrong, he is sacrificing his soul, commits what he knows
is a sin—lying—for the sake of promoting a greater good in the lives of the people around him.
He improves the entire village through his inspiration, however false it may be, and thus sacrifices
himself to their cause.
Don Manuel overcomes the orthodoxy of traditional Christian faith by adhering to its
overall message while ignoring some of its moral tenements and topical criteria. Regular practices
of almsgiving and forgiveness instill in Don Manuel‟s Christian followers the notions of serving
others before oneself, reinforcing Jesus‟ message of love through blind action. While beneficial to
society, these actions reflect hegemony within the society through consistent and unquestioned—
some might say “mindless”—benevolence. The other Christians in Don Manuel‟s village are
charitable to one another, not because they believe in charity, but because they believe that God
has instructed them to be charitable. This type of naïve acceptance without consideration of the
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hegemonic structures that constructed the ideals in the first place is precisely what autonomous
individuals overcome, which is why Don Manuel serves as a prime example of a self-sacrificing
hero. Aware of the potentiality of the non-existence of God, and unable to verify either way, Don
Manuel transcends the societal paradigm and steps outside of it to justify goodness towards others
on his own terms. Autonomously, he discerns a reason to assert goodness towards his fellow
human beings—for the sake of goodness itself—and commits to maintain the hegemonic structure,
not because he blindly follows it, but because he believes that enforcement of blind Christianity
attains the same goals that he wishes to achieve. Exhibiting the process of self-analysis and
discovery of the hegemonic structures within society that originally created his notions of selfidentity, Don Manuel discovers an autonomous self within until he manages to transcend those
hegemonies and utilize his newly empowered „self‟ for the greater good. Such is the idea behind
finding the true „self‟ in order to become our type of self-sacrificing hero.
Unamuno‟s portrayal of San Manuel Bueno brings to light a new notion of self-sacrifice, in
that it demonstrates to us the value of becoming evil in others‟ eyes, earning condemnation from
those one is attempting to save. In Unamuno‟s tale, only Angela and Lazzaro know of Don
Manuel‟s secret atheism, and the latter is inspired by it, while the former does not know whether
to berate or admire Don Manuel for it. Regardless, Don Manuel‟s contributions to the lives of
others are unquestionably benevolent. Ought God to condemn him to Hell for demonstrating
Christian values against his own inclination, or is such morality in the face of adversity to be
rewarded? Don Manuel lies, knowing that to lie is a sin; he lives the life of an atheist, knowing
that to do so is to condemn himself to the inferno. However, given that he does not believe in the
afterlife, we may struggle to define whether or not he is truly self-sacrificing. Don Manuel really
has nothing to lose by lying to the populace, at least in his view, because there is no Hell for him
to suffer in. He may commit any sins he deems worthwhile for the „betterment‟ of life on earth,
without fear of repercussions, so is there truly any sacrifice involved? In asking this question, we
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must not undermine the legitimacy of his life‟s sacrifice, for if there is no Heaven to look forward
to, then Don Manuel dedicates his life toward helping his fellow human beings without a chance
to gain anything for himself. If he cannot ascend to a paradise, then Don Manuel‟s mortal
existence is all that he has. He purposefully dedicates this limited existence towards helping
others; to undermine that sacrifice is to overlook his admirable sincerity in believing that the best
meaning in life is to contribute toward another‟s. Still, Don Manuel‟s absolute dedication towards
assisting the people in his village illustrates his willingness to live up to his personal principles by
stepping outside of the hegemonic structure of religion and still practicing benevolence toward
others, but it does not demonstrate any sense of willingness to challenge that structure at the cost
of one‟s existence and moral sense of self.
Perhaps a better example of Don Manuel‟s sacrifice is Dostoevsky‟s Grand Inquisitor from
The Brothers Karmazov. Believing in God and Jesus, this cardinal places the savior Himself in
prison after witnessing several miracles. He confronts Christ and tells Him that He is no longer
needed—that He in fact, is evil for His expectations of man. The Grant Inquisitor and his fellow
clergymen, out of benevolence—Christ‟s demonstrated mercy—believe that that it is unethical for
God to expect weak men to follow Him. A chosen elect might reach Him, but would He really
damn the rest? The Grand Inquisitor says, “Man was created a rebel; and how can rebels be
happy?” 60 It is in the nature of how humankind was created that they should sin, so God, having
created them, would be wicked indeed to punish humanity for rebelling against His covenant.
Instead of preaching Christ‟s Word as it has been recorded, The Grand Inquisitor and other
clergymen preach Christ‟s message of love—which they deem to be His most important message,
and lie about the rest. They claim to the populace that everyone can reach Heaven—they can even
sin, so long as they place the burden of their sins upon the clergy. The inquisitor and his followers
love the people, even more than Jesus—they claim—because they love all of the people, not just a
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select group of those strong enough to resist temptation. Demonstrating more love than Jesus
Christ Himself, the Grand Inquisitor dares God to damn him for that.
The Grand Inquisitor and other clergymen from Dostoevsky‟s story transcend the
hegemony of traditional Christianity in order to interpret Christian values to their fullest extent.
Unlike Don Manuel, these religious leaders hold no illusions that their lies will not condemn them
in the afterlife, and yet, the Grand Inquisitor steps forward and challenges Jesus to damn him for
his efforts. Loving his fellow human beings enough to make their lives better with hope for a
good afterlife, he lies to them, potentially condemning himself to Hell, and misleading the people
who trust him. Spitting in the face of the foundation of his faith—Christ—the Grand Inquisitor
willingly embraces the part of a villain in order to spare his followers the torturous realization that
their faith will be insufficient to save them in the end, for most of them are too weak and incapable
of following God‟s covenants as laid down. He steps outside the orthodoxy of Christianity in
order to better Christianity as a progressive method towards peace and love between human
beings. In so doing, he takes on the role of an evil man who would steal the free will of others in
exchange for their happiness, but is this really a sin? He claims that Jesus does not love His
children enough to lead them into Paradise, and thus He deserves no praise. On the other hand,
the Grand Inquisitor embraces all of God‟s children and endures the pains of sin for their sakes.
Sacrificing everything for the happiness of others, the Grand Inquisitor appears to be an ideal selfsacrificing hero.
The Grand Inquisitor‟s dedication to the underlying messages of love and compassion of
Christianity parallels Socrates‟ dedication to Athens‟ underlying message of individuality.
Constructed by hegemonic systems that promote autonomy, individuals such as the Grand
Inquisitor flourish in Dostoevsky‟s story to challenge the paradigms of Christianity just like Don
Manuel—taking the ultimate message one step farther and in so doing, undermining many of the
fundamental action-based assumptions of what an ideal Christian should look like. We have
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already discussed the preference of solidarity over autonomy that unites Christian followers in
Dostoevsky‟s tale to the point where they permit the Grand Inquisitor to reject their own savior.
The Grand Inquisitor even says, “This craving for community of worship is the chief misery of
every man individually and of all humanity from the beginning of time,” 61 but his personal
transcendence of this pattern is what distinguishes the Grand Inquisitor as a hero. Fully aware of
the hegemonic structures that comprise his society, he rejects Christ‟s preference of the „strong‟
over the „pitiful‟62 and chooses to embrace all people as children to be loved. This is in
accordance with the hegemonic ideals of Christianity, but not its hegemonic practices. Thus, the
Grand Inquisitor demonstrates the nature of heroism ideally by illustrating the significance of
defying the societal system of which he is a part, for the sake of enhancing its message and overall
purpose in the end.
Nonetheless, one major problem with the self-sacrificing heroism of Don Manuel and the
Grand Inquisitor is that the populace does not know what sacrifice they are making. By definition,
the type of self-sacrificing hero outlines thus far must not only transcend hegemony in order to
define the self and challenge that hegemony from outside of its construct, but they must also lead
others to see this hegemony for what it is and lead those others to self-awareness. Don Manuel
and the Grand Inquisitor skirt this responsibility by lying to their followers, further entrenching the
populace that they are both trying to free in an entirely new hegemonic structure that is centralized
around them instead of religion. This oppression is no different from the oppression that the
supposed heroes are fighting—it is just another wolf in sheep‟s clothing. Unamuno‟s Don Manuel
and Dostoevsky‟s Grand Inquisitor lack the “hero” aspect of self-sacrificing heroes because they
do not lead their fellow human beings out of oppression; they merely oppress their followers in a
whole new way. Such behavior suggests a cyclic existence of oppressors, whereby the hero of one
generation becomes the tyrant of the next, but the point of a truly self-sacrificing hero is not to
reshape society according to her desires. The point is merely for the hero to expose the oppressive
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hegemonic structures within her society and help to instigate reform of those structures. A hero is
not the leader of a new society, merely the harbinger of change in an archaic one.
Perhaps one of the best examples of a self-sacrificing hero who deconstructs the flaws of
his society but refuses to influence the construction of a new society is the character V from the
film V for Vendetta. Dedicated to the concepts of freedom and equality upon which his country
was originally founded, V engages the new government of post-apocalyptic Great Britain in order
to win these ideals back from tyranny. V transcends the hegemony of the new government by
escaping from one of its facilities for torturing and holding the “usual undesirables” and living in
solitude to hone his personal skills that he will eventually use to challenge and overthrow the
“prominent Party members.”
Introducing himself to the population of London by blowing up an important government
building, V then broadcasts a televised message that exposes the oppressive government for what
it is and drives the citizens of London to confront this oppression by joining him in a political
uprising one year from the date of his message. V then murders a series of political figures who
created the viral apocalypse that drove London‟s citizens into fear and panic so that those
individuals could exploit that fear in order to establish a new government with them in charge.
The deaths of these political figures encourage citizens to begin taking a stand, and ultimately,
when every household in London empties out into the streets donning V‟s Guy Fawkes costumes,
the absence of those political heads prevents the military from massacring the populace. In other
words, V leads the citizens of London to freedom from hegemony not only by encouraging them
to stand up for themselves, but also by making the personal sacrifice of his own righteousness in
order to protect the citizens from harm and carry out the work that they are unwilling and unable
to.
Evey—the woman who spends several months underground with V—demonstrates the
subversion of the populace that makes V‟s sacrifice necessary. At the beginning of the film when
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Evey is on her way to a friend‟s house for a casual date, she is confronted by three “fingermen”—
elect officers of the government charged with keeping Londoners in line. Once she learns their
identity, Evey is unwilling to defend herself from being raped and instead gives out a cry for
help—a cry that no other Londoner heeds for fear of retribution, except for V. Fear has driven
compliance into Evey and the other citizens of London—they turn their heads the other way when
members of the government act unjustly for fear of reprisal. After helping V by spraying mace in
the face of a detective who would have shot our hero, she says, “I shouldn‟t have done that. I must
have been out of my mind!” To which V responds by asking, “Is that what you really think, or is
that what they would want you to think?” Evey has no response because she does not recognize
the hegemonic structure that has prevented her from standing up from herself in the past and
continues to do so in the present.
Just like the „mask‟ that autonomous individuals recognize when they begin to define their
independent selves, Evey and other Londoners don a separate, public identity in the face of
government power. This changes only when the autonomous hero V confronts that distinction and
defies it, acting in accordance with his inner sentiments that run contrary to the government rather
than in line with hegemonic expectations. Indeed, as if to demonstrate to the people of London
that distinctions between outward appearances and inward beliefs has become necessary, V wears
a real mask in his public appearances to prevent others from discovering his identity. In other
words, his choice to don a physical mask presents a symbolic realization to the people of his
country that for self-protection, every citizen must pretend to be something they are not, which is
equated to childish costume-wearing fantasies rather than mature societies.
V ultimately confronts London‟s hegemonic governmental system of oppression by
defying the notions of security and control upon which the new government was founded—
defying public curfew, blowing up a building under the vigilant eyes of the city‟s officers, and
overtaking a television station to deliver an uncensored message. His methods unquestionably
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shake the sensibilities of the people caught up in the hegemonic system—as reflected by Evey‟s
response to his murder of Lewis Prothero and her calling him “a monster”—but also serve their
purpose of undermining the system itself through brute force and popular persuasion. He becomes
a villain in the eyes of many for murdering those who stand in his way, but in serving as a villain
to the existing society, V becomes a hero to the future society that will not be so dominated by
oppressive governmental figures.
Like Qin Chi Huang Ti, V willingly dons the mantle of a villain in the eyes of the populace
in order to accomplish a greater good, but he also demonstrates the ethical awareness of Jesus and
Socrates by not focusing his killing efforts on the populace itself. Whereas Huang Ti sent his
personal armies face-to-face with enemy troops to convert many nations into a unified one through
bloodshed, V instead spares the two clashing armies of civilians and military from a bloody
confrontation by severing the political heads of the government, preventing the military from
putting a quick and violent end to the uprising of the people. Unlike Don Manuel and the Grand
Inquisitor, he shares his intentions with the people of London through a televised broadcast,
unveiling the hegemony that he has grown to recognize and encouraging others to go beyond that
oppressive system. He does not ask the people—as Huang Ti does—to sacrifice themselves to
overcome this oppression, but rather takes that burden upon himself, going so far as to be viewed
as a “murderer” and “terrorist” by the very people he is trying to save—at least as we perceive the
views of the people through the media. Like Jesus, he challenges a hegemonic system by stepping
outside of it and encouraging others to do the same, but unlike Jesus—and like our other heroic
examples—he accepts the mantle of a “villain” by committing bloody acts of murder that even he
considers to be heinous. V sacrifices his soul for the sake of others—dirties his hands so that the
hands of the rest of the populace may remain clean—then gives his life so that his tainted actions
will not tarnish the new nation he has helped to create.
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Perhaps the only thing that makes V‟s character as a self-sacrificing hero imperfect is the
fact that his actions as a hero, by the time the film engages, are long overdue. Even though the
media portrays V as a villain by claiming that he uses violent weapons “against unarmed civilians
in order to broadcast a message of hate,” and referring to him as a “terrorist” and a “murderer,” the
fact remains that at the end of the film when the citizens of London are called to stand beside V to
watch the destruction of Parliament, every home shown on the camera is empty, because every
citizen in London has shown up in support of V‟s revolution. V has become the self-sacrificing
hero too late in the sense that it takes very little convincing to sway the populace in his favor—the
populace already recognizes the oppressive hegemonic structure of the government and has simply
failed to act. Our ideal self-sacrificing hero confronts hegemony when it is still too subliminal to
be recognized, when the populace itself is unaware of its own oppression such that they would
prefer to destroy the hero than allow her to destroy the hegemonic system. The positive attributes
of hegemony are too tempting to suggest immediate overthrow, and V‟s position as a hero merely
demonstrates that nobody was willing to stand up to tyranny sooner.
There is no specific model that comes to mind for the ideal self-sacrificing hero that this
essay describes, but that does not mean the heroes mentioned above are to be discounted for their
efforts. Socrates, Qin Chi Huang Ti, Jesus, Don Manuel, the Grand Inquisitor and V all represent
self-sacrificing heroes, and they should be recognized as such by modern society. However, we
must recall that Socrates, Jesus and V were mostly disliked by societal leaders rather than the
populace, suggesting that their challenging to hegemonic structures were not entirely
revolutionary, whereas Don Manuel and the Grand Inquisitor led their followers from one
hegemony into another, diminishing their value as heroes in the first place, while Huang Ti lacked
the moral component critical to comprising our self-sacrificing hero. Still, Qin Chi Huang Ti, the
Grand Inquisitor, Don Manuel and V all demonstrate the fundamental characteristic of unabashed
amorality—in one sense or another—for the sake of leading others out of hegemony to a greater
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good. Heroes such as Jesus and Socrates were honored in their respective times and are honored
now by their self-sacrifice, but the point of this essay is to demonstrate the honorability of heroism
as demonstrated by these others.
Mind, this is not to undermine the importance of heroes such as Socrates and Jesus.
Indeed, perhaps Jesus was beloved by so much of the populace not because He lacked the
dedication to His principles of changing the world for the better, but because His methods of nonviolence were more persuasive than those of Qin Chi Huang Ti or V. Similarly, Socrates lives on
in the hearts of scholars mainly because of his peaceful resignation to his fate; one could argue
that if he had challenged Athenian hegemony more forcefully, we might not remember him at all.
The types of self-sacrifice that we already honor are still valid and critical to constructing changes
for reform in society, but what of those heroes who are willing to put their souls on the line for the
greater good?
The ideal self-sacrificing hero is one who finds the true “self” at his core and recognizes
the oppressive hegemonic structures that exist in her society, then uses her new knowledge to free
others from oppression, even at the cost of the self that she has found. She has the morality of
Socrates and Jesus, but the dedication of the Grand Inquisitor, Don Manuel and V, and the
openness and timeliness of Qin Chi Huang Ti. A truly dedicated self-sacrificing hero gives
everything at a time when it is inconvenient for other members in society to recognize the need for
change, so that she instigates change when it is most important. Hegemonic structures entrench
themselves through normalization, and the purpose of the self-sacrificing hero is to be that bold
face that steps out from the crowd to cry out in opposition. Those who follow the rules of the
system inevitably will protect it and thus condemn the hero, but that only makes the hero‟s role all
the more important. Her role is to unsettle the founded beliefs of blind followers and lead them to
changes for a better world. Ideally, she would be as self-aware as Socrates, as forceful as Huang
Ti, as unique in perspective as Jesus, as dedicated as Don Manuel, as defiant as the Grand
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Inquisitor, as altruistic as V, and would possess the morality described by philosophers,
committing to all action for the sake of others at the cost of all that one can hope to give—if
necessary.
It is typical of society to chastise and oppress the abnormal, for that is how societies
construct a common identity. Nonetheless, is it necessary to condemn diversity for the sake of
self-identification? Current processes of normalization are inherently oppressive, and that
oppression extends especially to those individuals who dare to stand out and label hegemonic
structures as “oppressive.” Their boldness meets with resistance, whether from the structure of
power—as in the cases of Socrates, Jesus, and V—or from the populace itself that the heroes are
trying to reform—as in the case of Huang Ti. However, is it necessary to resist them, or ought
they to be recognized as the heroes they are, sacrificing self for others in a demonstration of
dedication towards the betterment of society as a whole? Just because he lacks the non-violent
tendencies of Jesus, V is no less valuable to the citizens of London as an instrument of reform.
Just because they lie to the people they are attempting to help, and defy normal sensibilities of
morality, Don Manuel and the Grand Inquisitor demonstrate no less dedication to truth than
Socrates. These men are self-sacrificing heroes, and they illustrate a different kind of sacrifice—
greater in magnitude, in some regards—than even Jesus, because they sacrifice more than life in
pursuing change for the greater good; they sacrifice their souls and entire selves for their cause.
Such is the kind of heroism rarely recognized in modern society, though it truly is the instrument
of reform that brings society towards a higher plane of existence.
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Self-Sacrificing
Villain

Throughout the course of this essay, we have examined the transformation of the hero in
parallel to societal perceptions. Originally, the hero was a mythical figure of celestial origins who
altered his surroundings using supernatural powers, then later the hero became a social outcast
who overcame adversity under divine guidance to transform the world around him using his
natural skills and abilities. Finally, the hero was viewed as a typical individual who overcame
normality and self-transformed into something more powerful, then used this ability to alter the
world of others. We have examined the process of this latter hero extensively, from the processes
of hegemony that inscribe his original notions of „normality‟ to his realization of autonomy and
subsequent ideal interactions with his society. Hegemony is a real force utilized by societies to
establish common identities, and thus inherently suppresses individuality, creating forms of
societal oppression. Self-sacrificing heroes are the individuals who identify these hegemonic
systems upon comparison of the self to society and arrive at a realization that processes of
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normalization are inherently oppressive and damaging to societies existing in an ever-transforming
world, since innovation begins with diversity in perspectives. These individuals exist
autonomously and thus contribute a true „self‟ to society that has the capability of examining
societal practices from an outside perspective. Their autonomy allows them to see the fallibility of
„invincible‟ societies and thus help those societies to improve in anticipation of future challenges,
but this ability earns our autonomous heroes naught but scorn for their inability to „fit the mold.‟
Heroes such as Martin Luther, Jesus, and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. are renowned for
their sacrifices because they placed themselves in danger by challenging authoritative figures in
history to follow the will of the populace, risking their lives and reputations so that others might
benefit from their actions. However, what is recognized from individual-to-individual—that the
best of friends are those that challenge us to be better people—does not typically apply in a
societal context. The media and public opinion denounce individuals who dare to speak out and
claim the populace is wrong, such as the example of Qin Chi Huang Ti taking matters into his own
hands and establishing peace in his geographical region by force. Heroes who take matters into
their own hands and challenge the people in this world to make it a better place meet with
resistance and must ultimately sacrifice themselves if they are to get their message out, because
the hegemonic systems that they must defy in order to instigate reform dominate the actions that
the populace takes to defend its solidarity, and thoughts that influence them.
Repeatedly, I have mentioned this connection between solidarity and oppressive
hegemony, but is oppression a necessary requisite to social cohesion? We regard solidarity in a
positive light because human beings can accomplish more when unified, particularly because
disunity frequently leads to conflicts, which negate the efforts of every society. Nonetheless,
when an individual submits her will to that of a single entity for the greater good, is this any less
noble than an individual who chooses social exile and self-sacrifice for the same cause? The
purpose here is not to insinuate that hegemony and social cohesion are inherently bad, but that
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linking these two positive attributes to a concept as self-deprecating—from a societal standpoint—
as oppression is unnecessary and damaging to notions of progress and innovation. To submit to
the hegemony of language is not to inherently negate the value of other forms of communication,
unless that submission automatically entails disdain for that which is different from the perceptual
norm. Individuals who have not been exposed to people with mental retardation often react
negatively towards individuals with mental disabilities because they have accepted the paradigm
of what „normal‟ is without considering that what is „abnormal‟ has inherent worth as well.
Normalization does not necessarily insinuate that individuals that do not fit within the box of
„normality‟ should be devalued, so long as those who accept processes of normalization maintain
an open mind. Thus, when a mentally retarded individual confronts the hegemonic perceptions of
a „normal‟ individual and challenges her notions of the inherent „rightness‟ associated with
normality, that „normal‟ individual ought to remain open to this challenge to her methods of
thinking and be willing to constantly restructure her perspective.
Adaptability is just as relevant to the individual psyche as it is to society, for only through
adaptation do individuals grow, as well as the societies of which they are a part. If experiences
and alternative viewpoints did not consistently undermine individual perceptions, then those
perceptions would never change and thus the individual would never grow wise to his everchanging world. Restructuring of one‟s perspective, as we have already examined, leads to further
understanding of the self, as well as further understanding of society and the diverse individuals
that it consists of. Negotiations between combating nations involve a deep understanding of one‟s
own societal perspective, as well as a deep understanding of one‟s opponents. Only through deep
understanding between diverse perspectives can common ground be established in order to link
those two perspectives together that they may grown together in the future. We understand the
world around us better by understanding the people in it, including ourselves, and through this
understanding, we learn to transform this world for the better.
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Autonomous individuals serve the same purpose as the mentally retarded individual
mentioned above, except that their role is more likely intentional. Like the mentally retarded
individual who challenges the naïve perceptions of a „normal‟ individual, the autonomous
individual defies expectations and proves that diversity is a positive attribute. Differences
enlighten understanding, and autonomous individuals who choose to be heroes have the
responsibility of demonstrating this through their actions. To bring an idea to light that many
other members of the populace share, but that the people in society do not share is difficult and
worthy of note. However, still more valuable are those individuals willing to step forward and
challenge the sensibilities of every person around them, to step outside of the paradigms of society
and reevaluate hegemonies in light of individuality, to defy oppression in the guise of normality
and encourage others to understand more of themselves for the benefit of all. Self-sacrificing
heroes willingly don the mantle of the villain by assuming the role on behalf of others and thus
allowing others to see the villains within themselves without ever having to dirty their hands with
disgrace. These heroes transform us by holding themselves up as a mirror to society and
transmuting the image there in accordance with their self-knowledge to help us see ourselves in a
better light. They are not „evil‟ in the sense that they have no philosophical conception of what is
right or wrong—indeed, as we have said before, self-sacrificing heroes must have a moral center
in order to be deemed heroic—but rather, they are „evil‟ in the sense that they take the burden of
sin upon themselves and give their souls for the sake of others.
A truly self-sacrificing hero recognizes the dangers of groupthink tendencies and
automatic, unthinking dedication to social hegemonies. She does everything in her power to defy
it and help others to see the potential in reality if only they would be willing to accept change for
the better. Change is a frightening concept to individuals; it is what prevents many from engaging
in the self-examination process that helps them to find autonomy, because it alienates the self from
society in the sense that it causes individuals to perceive themselves and their surrounding world
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in an entirely different light. This new perception can unveil horrific realizations of how awful
this world is, which is why so many are loathe to attain it, but only through this perception of the
world as flawed can we ever hope to change it for the better. Harbingers of change such as our
autonomous individuals have not been appreciated in ancient societies, and they are still not
appreciated today, for they compel us to look beyond our naïve notions that the world is more
pleasant than it truly is, and they require us to either accept that reality and thus lose our right to
hope, or to act on that perception, which is much more difficult than leading a tranquil life of
apathy.
Self-sacrificing heroes defy the sensibilities of normal individuals for the sake of a better
world. Theirs is an autonomous perception of the world as it is: flawed, and ugly, but filled with
potential. They do not conform to the oppressive hegemonies of society, nor do they permit others
to do so. Instead, they confront the reality that is existence by finding their true selves and
extending those selves outwards to encompass true conceptions of abstract concepts, including
those of right and wrong, of justice, of love, and of hope. These heroes recognize that helping
others to find this realization is more important than maintaining their personal essences of selfrighteousness, and thus they willingly sacrifice themselves for that goal. Imperfect examples
shown above illustrate the difficulties of a truly self-sacrificing hero, but ultimately, these
individuals do exist, and the problem is not that they are truly villains, but that society perceives
them as such.
The epitome of the self-sacrificing hero we have outlined in this essay is a self-aware
individual who transforms the world around him for the better because of his self-perceived moral
obligation towards others. This individual defies the hegemonies that imprison the
consciousnesses of others in society by unveiling the existence and malignancy of those
hegemonies to the individuals they imprison. At the risk—even certainty—of losing himself, this
hero who has transcended the realm of normal understanding reenters the world to save those who
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are still ignorant. This self-sacrificing hero is the freed prisoner from Plato‟s Allegory of the Cave.
Enlightened by the realization that the world is more than shadows on the wall, this autonomous
individual frees his fellow prisoners to show them what reality truly is, and is summarily executed
for defying those other prisoners‟ sensibilities. Modern society still plays the part of those
ignorant prisoners—chastising those who would dare to say society is imperfect for the sake of
promoting its goodness—and the time has come to change.
Occasionally, self-sacrificing heroes of the past are regarded as people who were „ahead of
their time,‟ such as Voltaire, whose pessimistic criticism of the French system of government did
not correspond with optimistic views of his time, and thus he was subsequently imprisoned and
exiled. 63 Will our modern society be perceived in the future as we today perceive the society of
18th century France? How many brilliant minds do we suppress in favor of solidarity over
betterment of ourselves? The time has come to cease suppressing the voice of the enlightened one
and to perceive morally-centered autonomous individuals for what they truly are. The harbingers
of change are not the villainous demons of uncertainty that society frequently portrays them as;
rather, they are self-sacrificing heroes who aid the innovation of the world today in order to better
the world of tomorrow.
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Notes
63

Butt, John. Introduction. Candide.
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